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THE NEW SEX DISCRIMINATION
ZACHARY A. KRAMER†
ABSTRACT
Sex discrimination law has not kept pace with the lived experience
of discrimination. In the early years of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, courts settled on an idea of what sex discrimination looks
like—formal practices that exclude employees based on their group
membership. The problem is that sex discrimination has become
highly individualized. Modern sex discrimination does not target all
men or all women, nor does it target subgroups of men or women.
The victims of modern sex discrimination are particular men and
women who face discrimination because they do not or cannot
conform to the norms of the workplace. These employees have been
shut out of a sex discrimination regime that still expects employees to
anchor their claims to a narrative of group subordination.
I argue that the lived experience of discrimination should
determine employment discrimination doctrine and not the other way
around. Accordingly, I propose a new regime for sex discrimination
law. The model for the new sex discrimination regime is religious
discrimination law. Unlike other areas of employment discrimination
law, religious discrimination law offers a dynamic conception of
identity and a greater array of different theories of discrimination. I
argue that sex discrimination law can and should work this way, too.
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On a broader level, the paper makes a strong normative claim
about the substance of Title VII’s sex equality project. I argue that sex
discrimination law needs to recalibrate its vision of equality.
Difference is universal. No two women (or men) are the same, and
this is a good thing. Thus the central task of sex discrimination law
should be to better recognize—and, in turn, protect—the distinctive
ways in which employees express their maleness and femaleness. It is
these differences, after all, that shape the way employees experience
modern sex discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
1

In 2000, Darlene Jespersen lost a job that she loved. For over
twenty years, Jespersen worked as a bartender at Harrah’s Casino in
2
Reno, Nevada. During her career at Harrah’s, she accumulated a
strong work record, earning the praise of coworkers and customers
3
alike. Things went downhill for Jespersen, however, when Harrah’s
4
adopted a new appearance code for its beverage service personnel.
The new policy—which Harrah’s called the “Personal Best”
program—required female employees to, among other things, wear
5
makeup during their shifts. The makeup requirement posed a
6
problem for Jespersen, as she never wore makeup on or off the job.
Jespersen explained that wearing makeup made her feel “ill,”
7
“degraded,” “exposed,” and “violated.” She felt that makeup robbed
her of her “credibility as an individual and as a person,” so much so
that she could not do her job well if forced to wear makeup during
8
her shifts.
Despite her many years of service and her exemplary record,
Harrah’s would not budge on the makeup requirement, and Jespersen
9
soon found herself out of a job. She responded by bringing a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
10
(Title VII), alleging that Harrah’s “Personal Best” program—
specifically the makeup requirement—amounted to unlawful sex
11
discrimination. Jespersen’s theory of discrimination was that the
makeup requirement compelled female employees to conform to a

1. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
2. Id. at 1106–07.
3. See id. at 1106–08 (describing Jespersen’s work as “exemplary” and noting her
favorable customer reviews and employer evaluations).
4. Id. at 1107.
5. Id. The “Personal Best” program was part of Harrah’s “Beverage Department Image
Transformation” program. Id.
6. Id. at 1107–08.
7. Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief at 34 n.8, Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104 (No. 0315045), 2003 WL 25859577. For a useful and comprehensive discussion of Jespersen’s case, see
generally Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup
and Women at Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed.,
2006).
8. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
11. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
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12

stereotypical standard of femininity, a variation on the genderstereotyping theory developed by the Supreme Court in Price
13
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. The thrust of the gender-stereotyping
theory is, in the words of the Court, that an employer cannot
“evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
14
stereotype associated with their group.”
In the end, Jespersen could not sustain her stereotyping claim
against Harrah’s. The Ninth Circuit concluded that her injuries were
too subjective to support her gender-stereotyping claim. According to
the court, “The record contains nothing to suggest the grooming
15
standards would objectively inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job.”
The court made clear that, as a general matter, an employee can
16
challenge a grooming code on gender-stereotyping grounds but that
the “subjective reaction of a single employee” is not sufficient to
17
support such a claim.
There is a coming crisis in sex discrimination law, and employees
18
like Darlene Jespersen are at the center of it. Sex discrimination law
has not kept pace with the lived experience of sex discrimination.
When Title VII became law, most instances of sex discrimination
involved overt discrimination that differentiated between men and
19
women, almost always to the detriment of female employees. And it
was not uncommon for employers to justify a discriminatory practice
by appealing to perceived or stereotypical differences between men
and women. Consider a prominent example. The Water and Power
Department for the City of Los Angeles administered a retirement
benefits system for its employees, which it funded, in part, through
12. Id.
13. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
14. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion).
15. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
16. See id. at 1113 (“We emphasize that we do not preclude, as a matter of law, a claim of
sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress or appearance codes. Others may well be filed, and any
bases for such claims refined as law in this area evolves.”).
17. Id.
18. I have borrowed the phrase “coming crisis” from an influential article by Professor Ken
Karst. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997).
19. See Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 644–46
(2005); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60, 465–68 (2001); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as
Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 167–70, 172–75
(2004).
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20

The Department required female
employee contributions.
employees to contribute greater monthly payments to its pension
fund than male employees, which meant that female employees took
21
home less pay than their male coworkers. The Department’s reason
for making women contribute more than men was that, on average,
22
women tend to live longer than men. The discrimination was formal
in nature, targeting women as a group.
The problem is that sex discrimination looks very different
today. Sex discrimination has become highly individualized. Modern
sex discrimination does not target all men or all women, nor does it
target subgroups of men or women—such as women who are
23
aggressive and men who are effeminate. The victims of modern sex
discrimination are particular men and women who face discrimination
because they do not or cannot conform to the norms of the
24
workplace. In addition to Darlene Jespersen, it is the male truck
25
driver who wears women’s clothing; it is the bus driver who cannot
find a bathroom to use while she is transitioning from male to
26
female; it is the effeminate man who sticks out like a sore thumb in a
27
rural Wisconsin factory; it is the new mother who needs extra breaks
28
during the workday to pump milk for her newborn baby; it is the
29
hairstylist who is fired from her salon because she is a butch lesbian;
and it is the overweight telemarketer who is told she is not pretty
30
enough for a face-to-face sales position. Time and time again, these
employees, often the most marginalized employees in their respective
workplaces, have struggled to find their footing in a sex
20. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1978).
21. Id. at 705.
22. Id.
23. Cf. Yuracko, supra note 19, at 175–77 (describing subgroup discrimination in terms of
trait discrimination).
24. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2548–49 (1994); Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2000); Gowri
Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither
Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 299–300 (2005); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111
YALE L.J. 769, 811–13 (2002).
25. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 (E.D. La.
Sept. 16, 2002).
26. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
27. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1058–60 (7th Cir. 2003).
28. Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
29. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 2005).
30. Marks v. Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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discrimination regime that still views the group as the focal point of
discrimination.
This Article initiates a conversation about the future of sex
discrimination. It lays the foundation for a new sex discrimination
regime that is tailored to the lived experience of sex discrimination as
it exists today rather than as it once did. The driving force behind my
argument is the idea that, when it comes to developing
antidiscrimination protections, the lived experience of discrimination
31
should determine the doctrine and not the other way around. I
believe that this is what Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had in mind when
he wrote, in The Common Law, that “[t]he life of the law has not
32
been logic; it has been experience.” The toughest obstacle facing
victims of modern sex discrimination is the need to anchor their
discrimination claims to a narrative of group subordination—to show,
in other words, that the discrimination they faced in the workplace
harms their group as a whole. My goal is to imagine a sex
discrimination regime that is not tethered to group subordination.
Sex discrimination law needs to move in a new direction. And
religious discrimination law provides a template for how to do that.
Religious discrimination occupies a special place within Title VII
thanks to two interrelated doctrinal features. The first is a dynamic
conception of what constitutes a religion. Like other areas of Title
VII, religious discrimination protects employees against status
33
discrimination —for instance, an employee being fired for being
34
Jewish. But what separates religious discrimination from the rest of
Title VII is that it also protects employees against religious-practice
35
discrimination —for instance, an employee being fired for refusing to

31. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 176
(2006) (“[D]octrinal formulations are less important to the law’s development than the cultural
experience in which those laws are embedded.”).
32. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881).
33. The status protection for religion flows from Title VII’s general nondiscrimination
command. Title VII provides: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 787 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII by adding a broader definition of “religion,”
which “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
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36

work on the Sabbath. What is more, religious discrimination law
embraces an attitude of liberal neutrality toward the particulars of a
37
person’s religion. For a belief or practice to count as a religion, all an
employee needs to show is that it is religious within her own scheme
of things and that it is sincerely held. The result is a body of law that
recognizes a vast universe of religious practices, each as distinctive as
38
the next.
The second doctrinal feature of religious discrimination law
flows immediately from the dynamic conception of religion as a
protected trait. In addition to the standard prohibition against
39
disparate treatment, religious discrimination law also imposes on
employers a duty to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious
40
practice. As a theory of discrimination, reasonable accommodation
goes further than the standard disparate treatment protection, which
36. See, e.g., Reed v. Mineta, 93 F. App’x 195, 196 (10th Cir. 2004) (involving an air traffic
controller who was fired because he refused to work on the Sabbath holiday).
37. Of course, Title VII takes a hands-off approach so as not to offend the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, which allows individuals to worship as they choose free from
government interference.
38. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128, 131 (1st Cir. 2004)
(involving a store cashier who, as a member of the Church of Body Modification, challenged the
employer’s “no facial jewelry” policy); Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470,
473 (7th Cir. 2001) (involving an employee who, as an expression of her faith, told people to
“Have a Blessed Day” when ending a conversation or written communication); Altman v. Minn.
Dep’t of Corr., 251 F.3d 1199, 1199 (8th Cir. 2001) (involving prison employees who were
reprimanded for reading bibles during a mandatory training on lesbian and gay employees in
the workplace); Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 772 (7th Cir. 1998) (involving a
police officer whose religious beliefs prevented him from guarding an abortion clinic); Peterson
v. Minidoka, 118 F.3d 1351, 1356–58 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving a public school principal who was
demoted after deciding to homeschool his children so they could receive an education in which
all of their classes would reflect “an aspect of God being the creator”); EEOC v. United Parcel
Serv., 94 F.3d 314, 315–16 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving an employee who wore a beard for religious
purposes); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving an employee
who was fired for missing work to attend his wife’s conversion ceremony); Chenzira v.
Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098, at *1, *4 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 27, 2012) (involving an employee who refused to get a flu shot, as required by the
employer’s policy, because the employee was vegan).
39. See, e.g., Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving a
police officer who alleged that he was discriminated against because he was Jewish); Campos v.
City of Blue Springs, 289 F.3d 546, 549–50 (8th Cir. 2002) (involving a plaintiff who practiced
Native American spirituality and who alleged that he was fired because he was not Christian);
EEOC v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 328 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving an Evangelical
Christian Baptist hospital recruiter who alleged that she was repeatedly told to soften her
religious expression).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Religious discrimination law’s reasonable accommodation
framework grows out of the Supreme Court’s decision in the now-famous Hardison case. See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75–76 (1977).
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only restricts employers from introducing bias into the workplace.
Reasonable accommodation, by contrast, requires employers to
redesign the workplace to account for the needs of their employees,
provided that doing so will not create an “undue hardship” for the
41
employer. From an organizational perspective, the advantage of an
accommodation framework is that it should promote collaboration
between employers and employees, the hope being that when an
employee’s religious practice conflicts with an employer’s policy, the
employee will negotiate rather than litigate to find a solution to the
problem.
Taken together, these doctrinal features create a legal
environment that caters to individuals rather than groups. Sex
discrimination law can—and I argue that it should—work this way,
too. My proposal is that the new sex discrimination law should track
the doctrinal structures of religious discrimination law. First, sex
discrimination law should adopt a more dynamic conception of sex as
a protected trait, one that affirmatively protects sex as both a status
and a practice. Of all the proposed reforms in this Article, this one
should be the easiest to implement, as the gender-stereotyping theory
of sex discrimination has laid the groundwork for just such a robust
protection. On top of that, discrimination claimants should have
greater freedom to define the nature of their sex practice, just as
claimants in religious discrimination cases do.
The second major doctrinal change is that sex discrimination law
should supplement disparate treatment analysis with a reasonable
accommodation protection. This is admittedly a more controversial
proposal, though it nevertheless dovetails nicely with a more dynamic
conception of sex as a protected trait. In making this proposal, I am
mindful of Professor Kenji Yoshino’s warning that we should not
42
think of reasonable accommodation as legal penicillin. Reasonable
accommodation is not a panacea, and I do not think it will cure all the
ills of sex discrimination. But I do think that reasonable
accommodation offers a better way for the law to contend with the
harms of modern sex discrimination than does the legal landscape
currently available to a discrimination claimant. The defining
characteristic of modern sex discrimination is that it is experienced
individually, and reasonable accommodation is an individualized
theory of discrimination. As we look to the future of sex
41. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
42. YOSHINO, supra note 31, at 167–68, 174–75.
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discrimination law, we need a framework that treats discrimination
claimants as individuals, not as members of a group. Reasonable
accommodation provides this framework.
For these doctrinal changes to take hold, we will also need to
recalibrate the vision of equality that undergirds sex discrimination
law. For most of its history, sex discrimination law has conceived of
equality in terms of treating men and women, as groups, in the same
43
way. According to this view, equality is cast in neutral terms,
providing formal protections for the sexes as compared against each
other. But the new sex discrimination demands a vision of equality
that is rooted in difference rather than sameness, a vision of equality
that understands that no two women (and no two men) are the same.
Going forward, the central task of sex discrimination law should be to
better recognize—and, in turn, protect—the distinctive ways in which
employees express their maleness and femaleness. It is these
differences, after all, that shape the way employees experience
modern sex discrimination.
The Article proceeds in four parts. The purpose of Part I is to
put my argument in context. To that end, it outlines the three main
theories of discrimination currently available in employment
discrimination law and contrasts two competing visions of equality.
From there, Part II tells the story of why employees like Darlene
Jespersen have such a hard time raising actionable sex discrimination
claims. More specifically, this Part develops a wide-ranging critique of
existing sex discrimination law, challenging the doctrinal rules,
historical fictions, and normative values that anchor the law to
narratives of group subordination. As a part of that discussion, I also
propose a new normative baseline for Title VII’s sex equality
44
project. The thrust of this claim is that Title VII should not define
sex equality in terms of what is good for all or even most women (or
men), but rather in terms of what individual men and women need to
flourish in the workplace.
Part III sketches a new framework for sex discrimination law.
Modeled on the protections currently available to employees in
religious discrimination cases, this new framework relaxes sex
43. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2012).
44. “Title VII’s sex equality project” is my own term. It is meant to convey that, because
equality is not a self-defining concept, the principal work of a statute like Title VII is to develop
some vision of what equality looks like. This Article contributes to this project—the project of
imagining equality—by proposing a new idea of what it means to treat the sexes equally.
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discrimination law’s conception of identity, making the law more
responsive to the needs of employees as individuals. It also adds
reasonable accommodation as a formal response to sex
discrimination, which will force employers and employees to shoulder
the burden, together, to accommodate differences in the workplace.
Taken together, these doctrinal reforms will bring discrimination law
more in line with the lived experience of discrimination as it exists
today. Reimagining sex discrimination law in this way will also
require that we rethink what equality means. Part III also argues that
sex discrimination law needs to embrace a more holistic vision of
equality, one that is sensitive to difference as well as sameness.
Stepping back, Part IV considers the broader implications of my
argument. The goal of this discussion is to jumpstart a conversation
about the future of employment discrimination. Accordingly, Part IV
raises some hard questions about where employment discrimination
law has been, where it is now, and where it needs to go in the future.
I. CONTEXT
Before turning to the substance of my argument, this Part offers
a brief tour of the doctrinal landscape of employment discrimination
law. This discussion highlights two fundamental features of the law.
First, it outlines the three main theories of discrimination that
currently exist in employment discrimination law—disparate
treatment, disparate impact, and reasonable accommodation. Such a
discussion is helpful because my proposal, developed in detail below,
is that sex discrimination law should shift from one theory of
discrimination (disparate treatment) to another (reasonable
accommodation). Second, it distinguishes between two competing
visions of equality that undergird employment discrimination law. In
terms of scope, the following discussion is purely descriptive. My goal
in the immediate Section is to provide a doctrinal foundation for my
normative claims about the past, present, and future of sex
discrimination law.
A. Theories of Discrimination
As a body of law, employment discrimination is concerned with
45
the “rights and responsibilities of employers and employees.” In

45. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES
xxvii (7th ed. 2008).

AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
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particular, employment discrimination law seeks to regulate a small
slice of employment decisions. Discrimination, in the broadest sense
of the term, is essential to the organization of a workplace. Employers
discriminate all the time—they make decisions about whom to hire
and fire, whom to assign to certain shifts and special projects, and
whom to promote and transfer. Employment discrimination law only
comes into play when one of these employment decisions implicates a
46
trait that is protected by statute. The primary task of employment
discrimination law, then, is to determine if an employment decision is
47
based on one of these prohibited traits.
To facilitate this inquiry, employment discrimination law
distinguishes between three theories of discrimination—disparate
treatment, disparate impact, and reasonable accommodation. These
theories are mutually exclusive, with each responding to a distinct
experience of discrimination. Disparate treatment governs a situation
in which an employer treats employees differently on account of a
protected trait. Disparate impact addresses cases of unintentional
discrimination, in which a nondiscriminatory rule has a discriminatory
effect. And reasonable accommodation covers instances in which an
employer fails to account for an employee’s special needs. I consider
these theories in turn.
1. Disparate Treatment. Disparate treatment is the analytical
backbone of employment discrimination law. The theory rests on a
principle—often referred to as an anticlassification principle—that an
employer cannot make employment decisions that classify an
employee (or a group of employees) on the basis of a protected trait,
48
such as race, sex, or religion. The critical feature of disparate
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
47. This is employment discrimination law’s discriminatory-causation requirement. To
state an actionable discrimination claim, a claimant must show that the alleged discrimination
was “because of” a protected trait and not “because of” a trait that is not protected by Title VII.
In a prominent age discrimination case, the Supreme Court described discriminatory causation
as a situation in which “liability depends on whether the protected trait . . . actually motivated
the employer’s decision.” Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). The Court
continued, “Whatever the employer’s decisionmaking process, a disparate treatment claim
cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and
had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Id.
48. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (“Roughly speaking,
this principle holds that the government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously
on the basis of a forbidden category: for example, their race.”). The principle was first identified
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treatment analysis is the causation requirement, which flows from the
statutory command that prohibits discrimination “because of” a
49
protected trait. Consider an example. Say that two current
employees—a man and a woman—apply for a promotion to be the
new director of sales, and the employer promotes the male employee.
To state a disparate treatment claim, the female employee must show
that she was denied the promotion for an illegitimate reason—
because she is a woman—and not for some legitimate reason, such as
an inferior sales record or a spotty attendance record.
The specifics of how a discrimination claimant proves a disparate
treatment claim—what kind of evidence is needed to support a claim
and what evidentiary framework a fact finder will use to assess the
50
claim—are beyond the scope of the immediate discussion. But it is
important to note that the touchstone of disparate treatment is
51
discriminatory intent or motive. In the previous example, the
employer’s decision created a discriminatory result because a man
was promoted over a woman. For the female employee to state a
disparate treatment claim, however, she must show that the
discriminatory result was motivated by a discriminatory purpose—for
instance, that the employer thought women were not cut out for
52
managerial positions.

by Professor Owen Fiss in a classic article. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157–64 (1976).
49. See supra note 47.
50. For further discussion of specifics in the context of sex discrimination claims, see
generally Jessica Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525 (2013).
51. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (“‘Disparate
treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical . . . . Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the
most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.”); see also Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (“A disparate treatment plaintiff must establish ‘that the
defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive’ for taking a job-related action.” (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988))); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (“The ultimate question in every employment
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the
victim of intentional discrimination.”); Watson, 487 U.S. at 986 (“In such ‘disparate treatment’
cases . . . the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or
motive.”).
52. See generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (critiquing the “lack of interest” defense to sex
discrimination).
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Under a disparate treatment rule, an employer cannot inject bias
53
into the workplace. This is what separates disparate treatment from
reasonable accommodation. In the latter case, discrimination is
defined in terms of whether the employer has adequately adjusted the
job to satisfy the needs of individual employees. By contrast,
disparate treatment does not question the way an employer organizes
its workplace. In the words of Professors Pam Karlan and George
Rutherglen, disparate treatment “essentially takes jobs as it finds
54
them.”
2. Disparate Impact. If discriminatory intent is the touchstone of
disparate treatment, then discriminatory effect is the touchstone of
disparate impact. Disparate impact captures unintentional
discrimination, cases in which an employment policy is fair on its face
55
but harms one group of employees more than another. The least
intuitive of the three theories of discrimination, disparate impact is
best explained in the context of an example.
Alabama had a statute that set a minimum height and weight
requirement to work in a correctional facility (five feet two, 120
56
pounds). The female plaintiff applied for a position as a correctional
counselor but was rejected because she fell short of the statute’s
57
weight requirement. She challenged the policy under a disparate
impact theory. At the time of the suit, women fourteen years of age
or older made up 52.7 percent of the Alabama population but held
58
only 12.9 percent of the correctional counselor positions. Taken
together, the height and weight requirements created a disparate
impact: the rule excluded from consideration 41.1 percent of women
59
and less than 1 percent of men. Importantly, the plaintiff’s claim did
not allege purposeful sex segregation. Even though Alabama adopted

53. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2009).
54. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1996). Professors Karlan and Rutherglen go on
to explain that Title VII “defines discrimination in a negative sense: employment practices are
unlawful only if they prevent individuals from doing the job as the employer defines it.” Id.
55. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15 (“[Disparate impact claims] involve employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”).
56. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323–24 (1977).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 329.
59. Id. at 329–30.
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the height and weight requirements because it was concerned for the
60
safety of its correctional officers, the rule still violated Title VII.
The full story of disparate impact is worthy of serious
consideration as we think about the future of employment
discrimination law. It is not, however, integral to my goal in this
Article. For this reason, the remainder of this Article is focused on
disparate treatment and the third main theory of discrimination,
reasonable accommodation.
3. Reasonable Accommodation. The newest of the three theories
of discrimination, reasonable accommodation, emerged on the scene
61
as part of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the statutory precursor to
62
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Today, reasonable
accommodation is a part of only a small handful of antidiscrimination
63
statutes, most notably the ADA and Title VII’s religious
64
discrimination provision.
The basic thrust of reasonable accommodation is that the
employer must take steps to modify a job to fit the needs of a
65
particular employee. Take an example from Title VII’s religious
60. Id. at 332. The Court characterized the plaintiff’s claim as follows:
The gist of the claim that the statutory height and weight requirements discriminate
against women does not involve an assertion of purposeful discriminatory motive. It
is asserted, rather, that these facially neutral qualification standards work in fact
disproportionately to exclude women from eligibility for employment by the
Alabama Board of Corrections.
Id. at 328–29 (footnote omitted).
61. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
62. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
63. Two other statutes that provide for reasonable-accommodation claims are worth
mentioning. The first is the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA), which protects military veterans against discrimination. See Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335 (2006). USERRA
requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabilities that arose during
military service or were aggravated by military service. See id. § 4313(a)(3). The second is
President Obama’s health care law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.). A small provision of the ACA—which has been overshadowed by the more
controversial parts of the law—requires employers to provide mothers who are breastfeeding
with time and space to express milk. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (Supp. V 2011). Importantly, the
law does not create a right of action for employees to bring a claim against employers who fall
short of their obligations, which makes the provision more aspirational than enforceable.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
65. See J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1385, 1390 (2003) (“[A]n ‘accommodation’ mandate requires employers to make
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discrimination jurisprudence. Say that an employee, a devout Jew, is
unable to work her scheduled shift on a Saturday afternoon. She
explains the conflict to her employer, noting that she cannot abide by
her religious beliefs if she is required to work on the Sabbath. At this
point, the employer is faced with a choice: adjust the work schedule if
possible, or face the threat of a lawsuit. Say that the employer cannot
make the requested change to the schedule, perhaps because doing so
would greatly disrupt the whole work schedule and inconvenience
many employees. In that situation, the requested accommodation
would pose an “undue hardship,” thereby relieving the employer of
66
any obligation to accommodate the employee. By contrast, if the
employer can make the change without great difficulty, the law
requires the employer to reschedule the employee so as to eliminate
the conflict between her work obligations and her religious practice.
Reasonable accommodation provides a more individualized
protection than disparate treatment. Under a disparate treatment
regime, the employer is prohibited from introducing bias into the
workplace but bears no responsibility to tailor the job to the needs of
its employees. Reasonable accommodation, by contrast, seeks to
mold the job around the needs of the employee, when possible.
Negotiation is integral to reasonable accommodation: employers and
employees must come together to discuss their respective needs and
67
expectations. By fostering collaboration in this way, reasonable
accommodation turns conventional antidiscrimination discourse on its
head. If, as Professor Christine Jolls describes it, “[t]he canonical idea
of ‘antidiscrimination’ in the United States condemns the differential
treatment of otherwise similarly situated individuals on the basis of
costly exceptions to their merit-based criteria in order to increase employment opportunities for
individuals who otherwise would be excluded.”).
66. Compare Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 272, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the accommodation of an employee’s beliefs would have imposed an undue
hardship when the employee, a Jehovah’s Witness, worked as a truck driver and refused to
make overnight runs with a woman who was not his wife, thereby limiting the number of trips
he could make), with Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1446, 1449, 1456 (N.D. Iowa
1995) (holding that an employer failed to sufficiently accommodate a Jewish employee’s request
to live in a city with a synagogue, when the employer required the employee to live in his
assigned sales territory and proposed a city without a synagogue), rev’d on other grounds, 120
F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1997).
67. In a leading case in the disability context, the Seventh Circuit noted that “[o]nce an
employer knows of an employee’s disability and the employee has requested reasonable
accommodations, the ADA and its implementing regulations require that the parties engage in
an interactive process to determine what precise accommodations are necessary.” Beck v. Univ.
of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996).
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race, sex, national origin, or other protected characteristics,” then
reasonable accommodation marks a significant shift in the American
antidiscrimination project. Specifically, it expands the idea of
antidiscrimination to cover the unique ways in which individuals
express their identities.
B. Visions of Equality
The fundamental goal of employment discrimination law is to
promote equality in employment. Though it lies at the heart of
American antidiscrimination law, equality is not a self-defining
concept. Consider the following question: What does it mean to treat
employees equally? How we answer this question reveals a great deal
about our normative expectations of what wrongs employment
discrimination law is supposed to remedy and how it should go about
doing so.
1. Equality as Sameness. The dominant view of equality in
employment discrimination law is based on the idea of sameness. The
sameness model provides that employers should treat like people in a
69
like manner. To satisfy this equality command, an employer must act
as if it cannot—or at least does not—appreciate its employees’
70
identity traits. The idea that employers should blind themselves to
their employees’ traits is deeply engrained in American
71
In his celebrated work Prejudicial
antidiscrimination law.
Appearances, Professor Robert Post seeks to uncover the hidden logic
72
of American antidiscrimination law. Post discovers that trait
blindness is crucial to the inner workings of our antidiscrimination
project: “Blindness,” he argues, “renders forbidden characteristics
68. Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 642, 643 (2001) (citing Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2000)).
69. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 54, at 10 (“Under the sameness model,
discrimination occurs when individuals who are fundamentally the same are treated differently
for illegitimate reasons.”).
70. See Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of
Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2003) (“The central thrust of Title
VII employs a ‘sameness’ model of discrimination, requiring employers to treat African
Americans and women exactly the same as others; their race and sex must be ignored and
employers must focus instead on factors related to productivity.” (footnote omitted)).
71. See generally Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
235 (1971) (discussing the origin and development of color blindness in antidiscrimination law).
72. ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (2001).
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invisible; it requires employers to base their judgments instead on the
deeper and more fundamental ground of ‘individual merit’ or
73
‘intrinsic worth.’”
Certain traits are designated off-limits as bases for an
employment decision. The idea is that these traits—such as race, sex,
and religion—are culturally salient and often trigger deeply held
74
stereotypes and prejudices. Employment law takes these traits off
the table, in the hope that restricting their influence in individual
cases will, in the long run, lead to wholesale social change.
2. Equality as Difference. We can contrast the sameness model
of equality with the difference model of equality. Whereas the
sameness model seeks to create formal equality, the difference model
75
is interested in creating substantive equality. It mandates that some
76
people need to be treated differently to be treated equally. The
difference model is the animating force behind reasonable
accommodation. When an employer adjusts the workplace to meet
the needs of a given employee, the employer is accounting for the
employee’s difference—the characteristics that set the employee
apart from her coworkers. Writing in the context of disability law,
Professor Anna Kirkland argues that the ADA charts a new course
for antidiscrimination law, specifically with respect to its conception
of equality: “What is new is the turn to accommodations for
difference and the acceptance that difference may be insoluble, and
that ignoring it may be the height of oppression rather than the best
77
hope for seeing past it.”
I want to break down the difference model into three
interrelated ideas. First, employees are different. There is no such
thing as a truly homogenous group: no two members of a group

73. Id. at 14.
74. See id. at 15.
75. ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD 127
(2008).
76. The best pronouncement of the difference principle comes from Justice Blackmun’s
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the prominent
affirmative action decision: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently.” Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational
Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV.
825, 863–64 (2003); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why
Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 609 (2001).
77. KIRKLAND, supra note 75, at 127.
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express a protected trait in exactly the same way. Second, these
differences matter. The experience of discrimination is all about the
salience of an employee’s identity traits. Those who stand out—that
is, those who are different from their peers—tend to be the primary
targets of employment discrimination. At the same time, the thing
that marks an employee as different is often integral to the
employee’s sense of self. Finally, the law should protect employees
because of their differences, not despite them.
C. The Claim
At this point, the necessary pieces are in place to preview my
claim. In terms of restructuring sex discrimination law, I propose that
sex discrimination law should take a page out of religious
discrimination law’s playbook. Unlike the other kinds of employment
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, religious discrimination adopts
a vision of equality that incorporates notions of sameness and
difference, blending them together to create a more holistic equality
command. It can do this because it allows employees to raise
reasonable accommodation as well as disparate treatment claims.
Such a framework would likewise make sense in the context of sex
discrimination. Like their peers in religious discrimination cases,
employees experience sex discrimination both because of who they
are (sex as status) and because of how they behave (sex as practice).
This last point is important. My proposal rests on the idea that
sex discrimination doctrine should reflect the experience of sex
discrimination as it exists today rather than how it used to be. Modern
sex discrimination is not easy. It is a highly subjective experience,
often targeting a single employee. It cuts across identity traits, defying
traditional notions of causation. And it is a product of work culture,
burdening employees who do not fit in with their coworkers. The
simple fact is that existing sex discrimination doctrine is not equipped
to deal with these sorts of cases. It is time for a new sex discrimination
regime.
II. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND GROUP NARRATIVES
When Darlene Jespersen challenged Harrah’s new makeup
policy, she faced an uncertain landscape. Because Jespersen’s claim
focused on her appearance rather than her status as a woman, it did
not fit easily among existing sex discrimination norms. The canonical
case of sex discrimination is formal disparate treatment, in which an
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employment policy subjects women to worse treatment than men (or
vice versa). Jespersen could not allege that she was treated differently
because she is a woman, as the makeup policy applied to all female
employees. Nor would it have been easy for her to prove that women
fared worse than men under Harrah’s “Personal Best” policy, as the
policy also had requirements that applied exclusively to men (for
example, no makeup, no ponytails). Ultimately, what Jespersen
wanted—to be free to work without having to wear makeup—is not
the sort of remedy that existing sex discrimination norms can provide.
This Part tells the story of why employees like Jespersen have
such a difficult time raising actionable sex discrimination claims. It
starts by discussing the complicated history of Title VII’s “sex”
provision. Although this history is interesting in its own right, it is
especially important for my purposes because courts have long used
the history of the “sex” provision as a reason to narrow the reach of
Title VII’s sex equality project. From there, this Part considers the
issue of subgroup discrimination, an experience of discrimination that
has confounded the courts since the early days of Title VII. In
particular, this discussion zeroes in on what has proven to be at once
the most elusive and most transformative theory of subgroup
discrimination: the gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination. I
use the gender-stereotyping theory as a catalyst to rethink Title VII’s
sex equality project. The thrust of my argument is that, as a normative
matter, Title VII should not define sex equality in terms of what is
good for all or even most women (or men), but rather in terms of
what individual men and women need to flourish in the workplace.
This Part concludes by considering another important gap in
existing sex discrimination norms: employees who face discrimination
along multiple axes of bias. As a regulatory force, sex discrimination
law tends to flatten identity, forcing employees to shed part of
themselves so they can squeeze into discrete identity categories. I
argue that sex discrimination law should instead seek to promote a
vibrant conception of identity, one that is driven not by the strictures
of doctrine but by the needs of individual employees.
As a whole, this Part offers a wide-ranging critique of existing
sex discrimination law, challenging the doctrinal rules, historical
fictions, and normative values that anchor the law to narratives of
group subordination. To develop this critique, this Part highlights the
stories of victims of modern sex discrimination. Along the way, we
meet transgender men and women, pregnant women, working
mothers, gender-nonconforming men and women, crossdressers,
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unmarried women, lesbians, and gay men, among others. These
stories draw attention to a set of doctrinal pitfalls that, taken
together, substantially limit the reach of Title VII’s sex equality
project. These stories also show that sex discrimination law’s
conception of identity leaves much to be desired. More than anything,
though, these stories remind us that antidiscrimination law is about
righting wrongs and providing relief, both in the legal and
psychological sense of the term. These employees have been fired,
harassed, humiliated, and otherwise disrespected. Some struggle just
to get through the day, while others lose their livelihood altogether.
Given what is at stake, we owe it to them, as well as to other
employees who face similar circumstances, to do the work of
antidiscrimination law as best we can.
A. A Troubled History
When Congress enacted Title VII, it embarked on an
unprecedented journey with respect to sex discrimination. Not only
was the sex provision the first of its kind, but it was seemingly
78
boundless. After all, the text of Title VII never defines “sex” or
“discrimination,” and the legislative history of the sex provision
leaves unanswered the central question of all of sex discrimination
79
law: What constitutes unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII?
In the story that haunts employment discrimination law, Title
VII’s sex provision is a quirk of history. The principal evil that the
Civil Rights Act sought to remedy was, of course, race
80
discrimination. Sex did not become a part of the Civil Rights Act
until late in the legislative process, when Congressman Howard Smith
81
proposed an amendment to add “sex” as a protected trait. Because
the amendment came so late in the process, Congress did not hold
hearings about sex equality in American society, nor did any

78. By Title VII’s “sex” provision, I refer to its prohibition on discrimination “because
of . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
79. As Cary Franklin explains it, “It is a commonplace in employment discrimination law
that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination has no legislative history.” Franklin, supra note
43, at 1317.
80. See id. (“When President Kennedy decided in the summer of 1963, in the wake of the
Birmingham riots, to pursue civil rights legislation, his aim was to secure legal protections
against race discrimination.” (citing President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to
the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-194-001.aspx)).
81. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Howard Smith).
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committee issue a report about the scope of Smith’s proposed sex
amendment. Except for a few hours of floor debate about the new
provision, Congress was otherwise silent on the issue of sex
discrimination. The prevailing view is that Smith, a staunch opponent
82
of civil rights, proposed the amendment in the hope of killing the
83
Civil Rights Act before it could become the law of the land.
Although the country may have been ambivalent about racial
equality, there was no way people were going to support the Civil
Rights Act if it also applied to sex, or so he thought. In the end,
Smith’s plan backfired. When the Civil Rights Act became law, sex
was right there alongside the other protected traits.
This story is a trap. Like most good traps, it is attractive, luring
unsuspecting victims into its clutches. It is hard not to be drawn into
the idea that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination was never meant to
be. Indeed, courts have taken the bait time and time again, relying on
84
this story as a reason to narrow the reach of Title VII. As Professor
Cary Franklin writes in a recent article, “[C]laims about the narrow
mindset and goals of the Eighty-Eighth Congress have exerted a
powerful regulative influence over the interpretation of Title VII’s
85
sex provision.” Franklin is part of a growing chorus of scholars who
86
have sought to correct the record on sex discrimination law’s history.

82. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 84–90, 115–16 (1985); Franklin, supra note 43, at 1318
& n.36.
83. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
14 (4th ed. 2007) (“[Smith] proposed the addition of the word ‘sex’ to Title VII’s list of
impermissible bases for employment decisions. Smith hoped that by transforming the civil rights
bill into a law guaranteeing women equal employment rights with men—thus drastically
affecting virtually every employer, labor union, and governmental body in the country—the bill
would become so controversial that it would fail, if not in the House, certainly in the Senate.”).
84. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220–22 (10th Cir. 2007) (relying
on this story as a reason to reject a sex discrimination claim brought by a transgender
employee); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084–85 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Willingham
v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091–92 (5th Cir. 1975) (relying on this story as a
reason to reject a sex discrimination claim brought by a male employee with long hair).
85. Franklin, supra note 43, at 1319.
86. See generally, e.g., Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at
the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 137 (1997); Carl Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the
Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37
(1983); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995); Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got
into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1991).
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Though their weapons are academic in nature, their fight has
considerable real-world implications. Sex discrimination law is
hamstrung by the story of a political ploy gone wrong. That Smith
may have introduced the amendment to thwart civil rights does not
tell us anything about why legislators ultimately voted in favor of the
87
provision. And yet the story endures, fostering a narrow vision of
sex equality that constrains Title VII’s capacity to respond to
emerging forms of sex discrimination.
This Section considers three instances in which sex
discrimination’s history stands in the way of sex discrimination’s
future. The first is discrimination against transgender employees. By
their very existence, transgender employees pose a challenge to
historical conceptions of sex and sex discrimination. Their identities
demonstrate that sex is not immutable, and their discrimination
claims suggest that sex discrimination is not as simple as treating all
men and women equally. In this regard, they are the poster children
for the new sex discrimination. I also consider two other instances in
which sex discrimination’s past inhibits its future—discrimination
against pregnant women and women who are breastfeeding.
Technically distinct experiences of discrimination, the pregnancy and
breastfeeding cases nevertheless belong together. Not only do both
revolve around motherhood, but in both instances the doctrine rests
on a suspect claim about the history of sex discrimination.
1. Transgender Employees. In 1981, Eastern Airlines fired a pilot
88
who had been with the company for over a decade. The reason for
the termination was that the employee had undergone sex
89
reassignment surgery without the company’s knowledge. Hired in
87. Smith’s amendment passed by a teller vote of 168 to 133. “During a teller vote
members vote by turning in signed index cards: green for yea and red for nay. Since 1993,
[t]eller [v]otes may occur in the House only when the electronic voting system is broken.” CSpan Congressional Glossary, C-SPAN.ORG, http://legacy.c-span.org/guide/congress/glossary/
tellervt.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
To the larger issue of legislative intent, it is dangerous to impute one legislator’s
motivations to a larger deliberative body, especially when legislators are not asked specifically
why they voted the way they did. The text of the statute—in this case Title VII—is a better
indicator of legislative intent than one legislator’s intentions, even if the legislator proposed the
law under consideration. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29–36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(arguing that courts should not look to legislative history to interpret statutes).
88. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082–83.
89. Id. at 1083.
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1968 as Kenneth Ulane, a decorated Army pilot who served in
90
Vietnam, the pilot was fired in 1981 as Karen Frances Ulane. The
airline could not argue that Karen lacked the requisite experience or
qualifications to fly because, despite her new appearance, Karen was
the same pilot she was before the surgery. At the time, transgender
discrimination was still a new issue for the courts. Yet Ulane’s case
presented a unique opportunity to fold transgender discrimination
into sex discrimination law. After all, Ulane was her own comparator.
What better example of sex discrimination than an employer who is
willing to employ a man but not a woman, when the man and the
91
woman are the same person?
The court did not see it that way. The Seventh Circuit held that
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination did not reach a claim
92
brought by a transgender person. History was not on Ulane’s side.
According to the court, “[O]ur responsibility is to interpret this
congressional legislation and determine what Congress intended
93
when it decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex.” From there,
the court surveyed the thin legislative history of Title VII’s sex
94
provision. It called the sex provision a “gambit” and a “ploy”
designed to “scuttle the adoption of the Civil Rights Act,” which
ultimately led to sex being “abruptly added to the statute’s
95
prohibition against race discrimination.” Taken together, the
“circumstances of the amendment’s adoption” and its “total lack of
legislative history” led the court to the following conclusion:
“Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation
96
apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex.”
Let us step back for a moment to consider what the court meant
by the “traditional concept” of sex, as well as what it means for the

90. Id. at 1082–83.
91. I have always been fond of how Professors Bill Eskridge and Nan Hunter frame the
issue in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984): “What could be stronger
proof of sex discrimination in the firing of [a] woman for a job held by a man, than the fact that
the man and the woman are the same person?” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER,
SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW: TEACHER’S MANUAL 193 (2d ed. 2004).
92. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084, 1086–87.
93. Id. at 1084.
94. Id. at 1085–86.
95. Id. at 1085.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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contours of sex discrimination law. Once again, Professor Cary
Franklin’s writing on the history of sex discrimination is instructive.
Franklin argues that the idea that there is a traditional concept of sex
discrimination is problematic for two reasons. First, the traditional
concept of sex discrimination is an invented tradition, not one that is
98
deeply rooted in sex discrimination law. In this regard, Ulane v.
99
Eastern Airlines, Inc. is part of a long string of cases that not only
refer to but also directly rely on a history that never actually
occurred. Second, because it appeals to an invented tradition, the
traditional concept of sex discrimination serves to narrow the scope of
100
Title VII’s sex equality project. We can see this at work in Ulane’s
case. The court rejected an emergent manifestation of sex
discrimination because it did not conform to what the court thought
of as the classic manifestation of sex discrimination, namely, formal
101
rules that treat men and women differently. Thus we can think of
Ulane as part of a sustained effort to weaken the normative force of
sex discrimination, an effort that is as old as Title VII itself and
continues to the present day.
Now turn back to the court’s reasoning in Ulane. In rejecting
Ulane’s claim, the court cited a handful of transgender discrimination
cases that likewise rejected employees’ sex discrimination claims on
102
largely historical grounds. Together with Ulane, these cases form
the transgender discrimination canon. The thread unifying these cases
is a concern about group narratives. The reason that these employees
lost their cases was because they could not map their claims onto a
narrative of group subordination—they could not, in other words,
97. The content of employment discrimination law depends on the scope of the protected
trait in question. To assess the past, present, and future of sex discrimination law, we have to
decide what we mean by sex. Put simply, there is no sex discrimination without sex.
98. Franklin, supra note 43, at 1312.
99. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
100. See Franklin, supra note 43, at 1315–16 (noting that courts “in the 1970s obscured [sex
discrimination’s] history” and “adopted the tightly circumscribed definition of sex
discrimination offered by employers in the 1960s”).
101. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085–86 (explaining that “Title VII . . . in its plain meaning,
implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and against
men because they are men” and that “if Congress believes that transsexuals should enjoy the
protection of Title VII, it may so provide . . . [but] we decline . . . to judicially expand the
definition of sex as used in Title VII beyond its common and traditional interpretation”).
102. Id. at 1084 (citing Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam)); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326–27 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr.,
403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff’d mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
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show that the discrimination they faced was bad for all men or all
103
women. In the eyes of their respective courts, these employees faced
a form of niche discrimination: most men and women do not take
hormones and undergo sex reassignment surgery, nor do they dress
and self-identify as a sex different than their birth sex. For these
courts, transgender employees cease to be men and women; they are
first and foremost transgender persons, wholly defined by their most
104
marginalizing trait. Once ascribed with the transgender label, these
105
employees find themselves shut out of sex discrimination law.
There are signs that judicial attitudes toward transgender
discrimination may be softening, however. In recent years, two new
theories of sex discrimination have emerged for transgender
employees. The first allows transgender plaintiffs to raise actionable
claims based on their gender nonconformity. For instance, in one
106
prominent case, Smith v. City of Salem, a preoperative male-tofemale transsexual was suspended from her job as a firefighter after
107
she began appearing in the workplace as a woman. The court held
that the employee could sustain a sex claim based on a gender108
109
stereotyping theory —a theory I discuss in great detail below.

103. See Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 (explaining that “discrimination based on one’s
transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of the Act” and that the defendant
must also “protect[] the privacy interests of its female employees”); Smith, 569 F.2d at 327
(reasoning that “Congress by its proscription of sex discrimination intended only to guarantee
equal job opportunities for males and females,” and that Title VII did not extend to the
plaintiff’s questionable situation in which he was not hired because he was “effeminate”);
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663 (declining to extend Title VII protection to transsexuals because
Congress intended to “restrict the term ‘sex’ to the traditional meaning” and because the
“purpose of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination in employment is to ensure that
men and women are treated equally”); Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 457 (“[E]mployment
discrimination based on one’s transsexualism is not, nor was intended by the Congress to be,
proscribed by Title VII . . . .”).
104. Sociologists refer to this phenomenon as a “master status,” a social identity that
overshadows all other aspects of a person’s identity. See Everett Cherrington Hughes, Dilemmas
and Contradictions of Status, 50 AM. J. SOC. 353, 357 (1945) (coining the term “master status” in
the context of race). In his work on homosexuality, sociologist Wayne Brekhus usefully
describes a master status as an “identity monopoly.” WAYNE H. BREKHUS, PEACOCKS,
CHAMELEONS, CENTAURS: GAY SUBURBIA AND THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL IDENTITY 36
(2003) (emphasis omitted).
105. My earlier work describes this experience in greater depth. See Zachary A. Kramer,
Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 219–20 (2009) (arguing that
homosexuality, as a master status, causes lesbians and gay men to be shut out of sex
discrimination law).
106. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
107. Id. at 569.
108. Id. at 572.
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According to the court, “[E]mployers who discriminate against men
because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the
110
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”
The obvious upside of the court’s reasoning is that it provides a
viable route to recovery, one that can be followed by transgender
employees in the future. But it comes at a cost. The court’s reasoning
effectively erases transgenderism as an identity. Although the
employee was asserting a female identity in the workplace, to avail
herself of the gender-stereotyping theory she had to take on a male
identity, namely, as a man who wanted to participate in the workplace
dressing and looking like a woman. As one commentator notes of the
case, “Transsexuals or transgender people per se do not really exist in
the Smith opinion; there just happen to be some men out there who
111
want to wear dresses.”
A second case worth mentioning involves an employee who
112
applied for a research position with the Library of Congress. The
113
employee applied in her capacity as a man and received an offer,
but the offer was rescinded after the employer learned that the
114
employee planned to join the workplace as a woman. The court in
this case compared the employee’s situation to that of an employee
115
who is in the process of converting from one religion to another. As
the court noted, Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination
would certainly protect an employee who faces discrimination
116
because of a religious conversion. Like a religious convert, the
transgender employee in this case was transitioning from one extant
117
identity to another, both of which fall within Title VII’s prohibition
118
against sex discrimination. It thus follows that discrimination aimed

109. See infra Part II.B.
110. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574.
111. KIRKLAND, supra note 75, at 86.
112. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008).
113. Id. at 296.
114. Id. at 299.
115. Id. at 306.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 295.
118. Id. at 306–07; see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)
(“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ protects men as well as women.”).
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at a transgender employee constitutes sex discrimination under Title
119
VII.
It is important to remember that these cases are exceptions to
the prevailing rule, at once a vision of a brighter future and a
reminder of how far we are from realizing this vision. A 2007 case in
Utah drives home the point. The plaintiff in the case, a male-to120
female transsexual, worked as a city bus driver in Salt Lake City. If
they needed to use the bathroom during their shift, bus drivers had to
121
use public facilities on their route, and the Utah Transit Authority
made arrangements with businesses for drivers to use their
122
restrooms. The plaintiff was fired after her supervisor discovered
that she was using female public bathrooms while wearing a work
123
uniform. Siding with the employer, the court framed the case in
terms of group harms: the city’s policy was permissible because it did
124
not disadvantage one sex more than the other. And, once again,
history proved to be an obstacle, with the court explicitly citing Ulane
and other decisions in the transgender discrimination canon as
controlling authority for the rule that Title VII does not protect
125
transsexuals as a class.
2. Pregnant Women and New Mothers. The thinness of the sex
provision’s legislative history also played a major role in the outcome
of the pregnancy cases in the 1970s. In the span of a few short years,
sex discrimination law was turned on its head, and then back again,
with respect to pregnancy discrimination. The battle over pregnancy
discrimination started with the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in

119. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308. Liz Glazer and I discuss transitional identity in greater
detail in Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651 (2009).
120. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 1219, 1224.
122. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *2 (D. Utah
2005), aff’d 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
123. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.
124. See id. at 1221–22.
125. Id. I distinguish between sex and gender discrimination below. See infra Part II.B. The
former focuses on bodies, targeting an employee’s maleness or femaleness. The latter, by
contrast, focuses on an employee’s masculinity or femininity. The difference between the two
has proved to be one of the thorniest, and yet most exciting, areas of sex discrimination law in
recent years. I argue below that, as a legal theory, gender-stereotyping paves the way for a new
way of thinking about sex equality, namely, that sex discrimination law should shield employees
against gender norms that seek to dampen constitutive elements of an employee’s identity.
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General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. Gilbert involved a challenge to
127
General Electric’s (GE) disability benefits program. As a general
matter, GE’s disability program covered male and female employees
128
equally. The plan did not, however, cover pregnancy and related
129
conditions. As the Court saw it, GE’s disability plan divided the
workforce into two groups: “pregnant women and nonpregnant
130
persons.” Although the former group was made up entirely of
women, the latter group included both men and women, thereby
making it hard to compare how the two groups fared under the
131
disability plan.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that GE’s disability
plan did not run afoul of Title VII’s prohibition on sex
132
discrimination. What matters most is how the Court reached this
decision. It started by looking at the legislative history of Title VII’s
sex provision, observing that the history is “notable primarily for its
133
brevity.” Without a strong statement of legislative purpose on which
to rely, the Court looked for guidance in its race discrimination
134
jurisprudence. “Discrimination,” according to the Court, means
126. Gen. Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). To be exact, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974), was the first case to raise pregnancy discrimination, in 1974. Geduldig involved
an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a provision of the California insurance code, which
exempted pregnancy from the state’s disability insurance program. Id. at 489. The Court
concluded that the pregnancy provision was constitutionally permissible because it did not
differentiate between men and women. Id. at 496–97. So long as the state did not treat men and
women differently, it could subject a subclass of women to less favorable treatment. Though it
was an Equal Protection Clause case, Geduldig laid the foundation for the Court’s decision in
Gilbert two years later.
127. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 127–28.
128. Id. at 130, 138.
129. Id. at 128.
130. Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 136.
133. Id. at 143.
134. Id. at 145. Specifically, the Court relied on Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145. Mancari involved a due
process challenge to a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) rule that gave an employment preference
for qualified Indians. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 541. Upholding the rule, the Court held that the
preference was a political rather than a racial preference. Id. at 553–54. For a critique of
Mancari’s racial/political distinction, see generally Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari:
Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958 (2011).
Ozawa involved a challenge by a Japanese man to the Naturalization Act of 1906, ch.
3592, 34 Stat. 596 (repealed 1940), which allowed “white persons” and “persons of African
descent” to become naturalized citizens but made no mention of persons of Asian descent.
Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 191–93. The plaintiff argued that he qualified as white for purposes of the
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something specific, having been developed by the courts for almost a
135
century. Reluctant to break new ground, the Court refused to
endorse any definition of discrimination that was “different from
136
what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant.” But
what did “discrimination” traditionally mean? The answer, of course,
is that “discrimination” means formal discrimination, where
employers divide employees into discrete groups.
The story gets more complicated from there. Gilbert is that rare
case that confirms that Congress listens when the Court speaks. Just
two years after the Court handed down Gilbert, Congress passed the
137
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).
The PDA explicitly
overturned Gilbert by amending Title VII to “prohibit sex
138
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.” The statute further
defines its scope as reaching discrimination on the basis of
139
Most
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”
important for my purposes, however, was the Court’s explanation—in
a later case interpreting the PDA—that Congress also disapproved of
140
Gilbert’s “test of discrimination.” This, of course, is a reference to
the Gilbert Court’s conclusion that sex discrimination be understood
as the formal division of the sexes into two groups.
By all accounts, the PDA should have put Gilbert to rest. Yet the
decision continues to play a major role in sex discrimination law,
preventing Title VII from intervening in current controversies.
Gilbert operates as what Professor Deborah Widiss calls a “shadow
precedent,” a case that courts continue to follow even though it is no
141
longer good law. Widiss demonstrates that lower courts act as if

law. Id. at 195. The Court concluded that the plaintiff was “clearly of a race which is not
Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side.” Id. at 198.
135. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145 (“The concept of ‘discrimination,’ of course, was well
known at the time of the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth
Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial construction.”).
136. Id.
137. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
138. Id.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
140. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
141. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 515 (2009).

KRAMER IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

920

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/26/2013 9:26 AM

[Vol. 63:891

Congress never enacted the PDA, sometimes even citing Gilbert as
142
controlling authority.
We can see this dynamic at work in cases involving
discrimination against female employees who are breastfeeding. Like
pregnancy, breastfeeding is a uniquely female experience. And also
like pregnancy, it does not affect all female employees, which means
that it creates a subclass of female employees. The breastfeeding
example is especially useful because it highlights the individualized
nature of modern sex discrimination, as the employee is seeking to
mold the workplace around her unique needs.
143
Consider a prominent example. The plaintiff, a news producer
144
for MSNBC, returned to work shortly after giving birth to her son.
Because she was breastfeeding, the plaintiff wanted a private space
145
where she could pump. Initially, MSNBC let her use an empty
146
editing room. But her coworkers, who did not know the room was
147
occupied, eventually tried to enter the room while she was using it.
Despite her requests, MSNBC was unable to provide the plaintiff
148
with a suitable alternative space to pump. This led to a larger
conflict about scheduling, and the plaintiff ultimately resigned her
149
position.
She sued and lost. The district court concluded that the “drawing
of distinctions among persons of one gender on the basis of criteria
that are immaterial to the other . . . is not the sort of behavior covered
150
by Title VII.” This tracks the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gilbert,
limiting the reach of sex discrimination law to employment policies
that divide men and women into distinct groups. The court did not
stop there, however. As a means of lending historical force to its
ruling, the court explained that this rule was “was made clear more
151
than twenty years ago in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.” It is as if
the PDA never existed.

142. See id. at 553–56 (demonstrating that courts, in cases involving breastfeeding and
prescription contraception, still rely on Gilbert).
143. Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
144. Id. at 306–07.
145. Id. at 307.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 308.
150. Id. at 309.
151. Id.
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Stepping back, the larger point I want to make about history is
that sex discrimination law is haunted by the ghosts of its early cases.
These cases settled on a specific idea about what does and does not
count as sex discrimination, and that idea has become so
commonplace that courts act as if it were embedded in the DNA of
sex discrimination law. I want to push back against the idea that the
traditional conception of sex discrimination should continue to
undergird Title VII. However entrenched it may seem, this idea is not
essential to Title VII’s sex equality project. There is nothing in the
language of the statute—nor, for that matter, is there anything in the
actual legislative history of the law—that limits Title VII to such a
narrow conception of discrimination. And yet the idea persists
because it is tied to a historical account of the sex provision that is
suspect at best.
It has been almost fifty years since the Civil Rights Act became
law, and in that time sex discrimination—and by this I mean the lived
experience of sex discrimination—has evolved into something new.
Sex discrimination law has not kept pace with the changing nature of
sex discrimination. At its most fundamental level, antidiscrimination
law is in the business of creating change—to change people’s attitudes
about each other, to change the way employers organize their
workplaces, and to change the social structure of society at large. To
bring about the kinds of change needed today, sex discrimination law
must also change. It can start by moving past its own troubled history.
B. Subgroups and Stereotypes
Since the early days of Title VII, courts have been confounded
by the issue of subgroup discrimination. Some of the earliest sex
discrimination cases were brought by flight attendants—or
stewardesses, as the job was called back then—who were challenging
152
the airline industry’s discriminatory practices toward women. To
cultivate the dual image of flight attendants as both potential bride
153
and sex object, the airlines went to great lengths to control their

152. In her wonderful book, Femininity in Flight, historian Kathleen Barry documents in
great detail the early Title VII litigation involving female flight attendants. See generally
KATHLEEN M. BARRY, FEMININITY IN FLIGHT: A HISTORY OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS (2007).
153. Barry describes the shift of the stewardess ideal from daring adventurer to glamour
icon to, ultimately, a potential homemaker for passengers, a genuine “bride school.” Id. at 42–
53. Another commentator notes that airlines eventually sought to hire stewardesses who were
“young, beautiful, and single in order to attract the predominantly male customers.” Toni Scott
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employees’ private lives. Marriage and pregnancy were grounds
for dismissal, and the airlines forced flight attendants to retire when
156
they reached a certain age, usually between thirty and thirty-five.
The airlines were not engaging in wholesale discrimination against all
women. Rather, they were discriminating against some women.
Within the subgroup of women who work as flight attendants, the
rules drew distinctions between single women and married women, as
well as between older women and younger women.
Subgroup discrimination is not always defined by job categories,
however. Another prominent form of subgroup discrimination occurs
when an employer targets some women (or men) because they
have—or do not have—a particular trait. For instance, say an
employer will hire men with school-aged children but not women with
157
school-aged children. Even though the employer may not have a
policy against hiring women as a general matter, this specific rule
disadvantages a subgroup of women (women with school-aged
158
children). A leading antidiscrimination scholar, Kimberly Yuracko,
has coined the phrase “trait discrimination” to describe the
159
experience of discrimination in these subgroup cases. The label is
especially valuable because it captures the essence of subgroup
Reed, Flight Attendant Furies: Is Title VII Really the Solution to Hiring Policy Problems?, 58 J.
AIR L. & COM. 267, 270 (1992). She goes on:
The stewardess, as the ultimate sales pitch, had to be the ultimate woman. Many
airlines required that flight attendants be women under 25 years of age, under 115
pounds, and under 5 feet 4 inches. The stewardess became the image of the industry
and the lure for air traveling businessman.
Id. (footnote omitted).
154. See, e.g., Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 781 (E.D. La. 1967)
(involving a challenge to Delta’s rule prohibiting flight attendants from getting married). During
the Cooper litigation, a Delta witness testified that single women made better stewardesses than
married women for a variety of reasons: they gained better acceptance among passengers, they
could easily change their schedules, and they had a lower likelihood of becoming pregnant. Id.
at 782. Other cases involving no-marriage rules include the following: Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971); Lansdale v. United Airlines, Inc., 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.
1971); and Evenson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1967).
155. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff’d, 700 F.2d 695
(11th Cir. 1982); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 689 (E.D. Va.
1976), aff’d, 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
156. In Cooper, for example, Delta would not employ stewardesses after their thirty-fifth
birthdays. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. at 782.
157. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971).
158. Id. at 544.
159. Yuracko, supra note 19, at 170 (“An employer may be perfectly willing to hire women
or men but may simply refuse to hire women or men with particular traits. I refer to this as trait
discrimination.”).
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discrimination: discrimination based on sex plus some other trait.
161
The other trait can be another protected trait, like race, or an
162
unprotected trait, like whether the employee has short or long hair.
Within subgroup discrimination, the thorniest issue concerns the
scope of the gender-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination. The
gender-stereotyping theory has its roots in a 1989 Supreme Court
decision, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. The case revolved around
Ann Hopkins’s unsuccessful partnership bid at the consulting firm
Price Waterhouse. Hopkins had worked for the firm for five years
163
before applying for the promotion to partner. Of the eighty-eight
employees up for partnership that year, Hopkins was the only
164
woman. In fact, had she been successful, Hopkins would have been
only the eighth female partner at the firm, out of 662 partners then
165
affiliated with the firm. As part of its review process, Price
Waterhouse solicited feedback about the candidates from partners
across the country, even from partners who had little to no contact
166
with the applicant.
The feedback on Hopkins revealed that the partners were
conflicted about her candidacy. On the one hand, the partners viewed
her work product favorably, citing in particular her work landing,
almost singlehandedly, a lucrative contract with the federal

160. Yuracko distinguishes between sex-neutral and sex-specific trait discrimination. Id. An
example of the former would be a rule against hiring anyone with, say, a tattoo—a rule that cuts
across sex lines, making it sex neutral. An example of the latter would be an employer who
“may find a particular trait disqualifying only in individuals of one sex (e.g., crew cuts on women
or long hair on men).” Id. For purposes of this paper, I am only concerned with sex-specific trait
discrimination.
161. See, e.g., Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ.A.99-3891, 2000 WL
1610775, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000) (involving an employer who refused to hire a black
woman who had dyed her hair blonde); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving an employer who prohibited an African American female from
wearing her hair in cornrows).
162. See Tavora v. NY Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving an
employer who required male employees, but not female employees, to have short hair);
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1975) (involving an
employer who would employ women, but not men, with long hair); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of
Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1358 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (involving an employer who required men to
have short hair but had no such rule for women).
163. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 232.
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government. On the other hand, the partners voiced concerns about
Hopkins’s interactions with coworkers. The partners depicted
168
Hopkins as difficult to work with and rude to support staff. It was
these latter comments, about Hopkins’s so-called “interpersonal
169
skills,” that raised the specter of sex discrimination. The partners
said that she was “macho,” that she “overcompensated for being a
170
woman,” and that she needed “a course at charm school.” Perhaps
the most critical fact, however, was the advice given to Hopkins about
how she could improve her chances for making partner in the
171
future.
She was told to “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
172
styled, and wear jewelry.”
Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse under Title VII, alleging sex
discrimination. The case made its way to the Supreme Court, where
the Court ultimately sided with Hopkins. In many ways, the case was
easy for the Court. As Justice Brennan wrote for a plurality of the
Court, “[I]f an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be
corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is
the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the
173
criticism.”
But the Court went deeper than that, offering a
seemingly broad theory of sex discrimination. “In the specific context
of sex stereotyping,” Justice Brennan wrote, “an employer who acts
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
174
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.” This marked a
significant change in the nature of sex discrimination jurisprudence,
which up until Price Waterhouse had been focused primarily on status
discrimination, that is, discrimination against an employee in her
capacity as a woman (or his capacity as a man). Recognizing that it
was breathing new life into sex discrimination law, the Court
bolstered its legal rule by declaring that “we are beyond the day when
167. Id. at 233.
168. Id. at 235.
169. Id. at 234–35.
170. Id. at 235.
171. Id. Incidentally, the man who offered this advice, Thomas Beyer, was Hopkins’s
mentor at the firm and the chief supporter of her candidacy for partner. See ANN BRANIGAR
HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: MAKING PARTNER THE HARD WAY 147–48, 213 (1996). The Court
used this advice as evidence of discriminatory intent; it was more likely evidence of a supporter
trying to counsel a candidate on how to navigate a tricky political situation.
172. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
173. Id. at 256.
174. Id. at 250.
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an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that
175
they matched the stereotype associated with their group.”
Note how the Court’s reasoning recast the relationship between
the employee and the employee’s group. Rather than formally
comparing men and women as groups, the Court’s definition of
discrimination focused on how the particular employee failed to live
up to the employer’s idea about how men or women are supposed to
look and act. The discriminatory comparison is therefore between the
employee and a stereotypical employee, a heuristic rather than a real
person. Moreover, Price Waterhouse pushes Title VII beyond the
realm of biological sex to capture the performative aspects of an
employee’s identity. In this regard, the decision echoes the work of
176
feminist scholars who sought to disaggregate sex and gender —the
former refers to biological differences between men and women,
whereas the latter describes the cultural expressions of masculinity
177
and femininity. Although Hopkins was the only woman up for
partnership that year, she stumbled not because she was a woman but
because of how she performed her womanhood in the workplace—
what she wore, how she walked, how she talked. Price Waterhouse
was indeed a watershed moment in the arc of sex discrimination law.
After Price Waterhouse, writes Professor Katherine Franke, “bodies
178
have dropped out of the equation.”
1. Contested Terrain. In practice, the gender-stereotyping theory
has proven to be a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the theory has
been a source of novel victories for outsider employees. For instance,
179
180
lesbian and gay employees, transgender employees, and working
175. Id. at 251.
176. See generally, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1
(1995); Franke, supra note 86.
177. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The word ‘gender’ has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal
characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes. That is to say,
gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to male.”).
178. Franke, supra note 86, at 95.
179. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (gay man); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 407 (D. Mass. 2002) (same); Heller v.
Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1216 (D. Or. 2002) (lesbian woman).
180. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C.
2008).
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mothers have all used the gender-stereotyping theory as a means to
remedy sex discrimination. On the other hand, other outsider
employees, sometimes the very same groups of outsider employees
who have had success with the theory, have found that the theory
frustrated their cases, with courts concluding that such employees are
182
trying to “bootstrap” protection for unprotected traits.
The
doctrinal confusion over the theory—the struggle over whether it is a
pioneering step for sex discrimination law or the basis for a suspicious
litigation tactic—exists because the normative underpinnings of the
theory remain elusive. When the Supreme Court declared that sex
183
stereotyping violated Title VII, it never really explained why.
Stepping into this void, scholars have offered different ways of
thinking about the gender-stereotyping theory in particular and
subgroup discrimination more generally. I want to highlight two such
scholarly perspectives as a means of distinguishing my own account,
which I develop in the following Section. These scholars offer
competing visions of how and why the gender-stereotyping theory
works, and they do so by considering the analogue to Ann Hopkins’s
masculine woman: a man in a dress.
The first comes from Professor Mary Anne Case, who, a few
years after the Court handed down Price Waterhouse, wrote an
influential article on effeminate men in sex discrimination law. Case
argues, simply but elegantly, that “the world will not be safe for
women in frilly pink dresses—they will not, for example, generally be
as respected as either men or women in gray flannel suits—unless and
184
until it is made safe for men in dresses as well.” Case’s perspective is
rooted in the goal of protecting “the stereotypically feminine” from
181. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45–48 (1st Cir. 2009); Back v.
Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117–24 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Nev.
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (taking judicial notice of the stereotype
that women and not men are responsible for family caregiving).
182. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2007); Dawson
v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217–20 (2d Cir. 2005).
183. My explanation for why the Court did not develop a normative account to go along
with its doctrinal ruling is because Hopkins’s case was too easy. Given the facts of her case,
Hopkins clearly faced discrimination “because of” sex. She was the only woman up for partner
that year, at a firm with relatively few female partners. Not only was the firm’s glass ceiling
visible, but the partners did little to conceal their motivations for not pursuing Hopkins’s
candidacy, namely, that she was not the kind of woman they wanted as a partner. Had she
dressed and acted differently, there would not have been any need for litigation. Hopkins
herself tells the story of her career and quest for partnership at Price Waterhouse in her
autobiography. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 171.
184. Case, supra note 176, at 7.
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becoming enshrined in law and culture as being less worthy of respect
185
than traits traditionally coded as masculine. Importantly, Case does
not endorse a sameness model of sex equality, nor, for that matter,
does she see her intervention as making a difference-based
186
argument. Instead, Case argues for melding the two approaches,
with respect to equality of the sexes, by disaggregating gender from
sex and by allowing both men and women to express both masculine
187
and feminine behaviors and identities. As she describes it, the goal
of Case’s project is “to make the world safe for us all, norms and
exceptions, men and women, masculine and feminine, and every
188
shade in between.”
We can contrast Case’s view with that of Yuracko’s, who
articulates a different vision of the theory in her work on trait
189
discrimination. Whereas Case sees value in protecting men in “frilly
pink dresses,” Yuracko questions whether sex discrimination should
protect such behaviors. She argues that it means something different
190
when a woman wears a dress than when a man does. “All gender
191
norms . . . are not created equal,” Yuracko argues. Therefore, she
continues, “[e]mployers may recognize some norms without impeding
192
[sex] equality in the workplace.” The problem with trait neutrality,
Yuracko argues, is that we lose sight of the real harms of sex
discrimination—norms that prevent men or women from being full
193
and active participants in the workplace. This is why she is reluctant

185. Id. at 3.
186. Id. at 102–03.
187. Id. at 103.
188. Id. at 105.
189. See Yuracko, supra note 19, at 179–204.
190. See id. at 188 (“In a gendered society, women and men simply cannot possess the same
trait in precisely the same way.”); id. at 196 (“In a sexist society, nothing done by men and
women has precisely the same meaning. Traits are not understood or viewed as isolated
technical attributes. They are necessarily viewed in relation to all of the other traits an
individual possesses and through a systematically gendered lens.”).
191. Id. at 201.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 202 (“Allowing employers to act on the gender norm that makes men in
dresses seem deviant does not impede the ability of men (or women) to participate fully and
effectively in the work world.”). Later, she proposes a vision of sex discrimination based on
what she calls the “power–access approach.” Id. at 225. The thrust of the power–access
approach is as follows: “The power–access approach treats as actionable sex discrimination only
those forms of sex-specific trait discrimination that are based on gender norms or scripts that
inhibit the ability of individuals of a particular sex to participate successfully in the work world.”
Id.
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to protect the man in the dress against discrimination. “[M]en are not
disadvantaged in the work world by being forced to mimic the
194
clothing style of the ideal male worker,” she writes. Though such a
195
rule will disadvantage “some men,” —namely, men who wear
women’s clothing—Yuracko is more concerned with the “substantive
196
sex equality that is Title VII’s goal,” from which she seems to adopt
a group-centric conception of equality.
2. Rethinking Sex Equality. The example of the man in a dress is
not just some abstract hypothetical. In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana,
197
Inc., Peter Oiler lost his job as a truck driver for the grocery chain
Winn-Dixie after his boss discovered that Oiler was cross-dressing
198
during his off-hours. Oiler is a good case with which to rethink Title
VII’s commitment to sex equality, specifically with respect to Title
VII’s antistereotyping principle. The thrust of my argument is that, as
a normative matter, Title VII should not define sex equality in terms
of what is good for all or even most women (or men), but rather in
terms of what individual men and women need to flourish in the
workplace. To make this point, I borrow an idea from Case’s account
of sex equality, and I disagree with one from Yuracko’s account of
sex equality.
Let us start, however, with the nature of the discrimination faced
by Peter Oiler. Winn-Dixie did not have a formal rule prohibiting
199
men from wearing women’s clothing. Instead, the company applied
an ad hoc rule once it discovered Oiler’s secret life as a cross200
dresser. In this sense, Oiler was in a class all by himself; he was
targeted because of the way he, as an individual, performed his
manhood. The company was, no doubt, operating on the basis of a
stereotype: men should not wear women’s clothing. Prescriptive in

194. Id. at 202.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept.
16, 2002).
198. Id. at *2.
199. See id. (“[Oiler] was not terminated because he violated any Winn-Dixie on-duty dress
code.”).
200. See id. (noting that the defendants fired Oiler because the owners believed “that if
Winn-Dixie’s customers learned of plaintiff’s lifestyle, i.e., that he regularly crossdressed and
impersonated a woman in public, they would shop elsewhere and Winn-Dixie would lose
business”).
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201

nature, the stereotype not only dictates appropriate behavior—a
“real” man wears men’s clothing—but also punishes those who fail to
conform to this behavior. This highlights the defining characteristic of
modern discrimination. Whereas earlier forms of discrimination
focused on an employee’s status as a member of a group, modern
discrimination has more to do with work-culture norms and the ways
in which an employee’s behavior violates these norms. After all, not
all outsiders face discrimination in the workplace. Discriminators
target particular victims because of who they are and how they act.
There is no question that an employee’s group membership factors
into this calculus; this is unavoidable so long as marginalized traits are
salient in our culture. But the critical point is that, by and large, the
202
days of top-down discrimination are behind us.
Modern
discrimination is the product of a complex web of work-culture
203
204
205
norms,
stereotypes,
and unconscious biases,
which work
together to make discrimination subtle, messy, and more personal
206
than ever before. Discrimination is no longer just about who you
are; it is also about how you express yourself and whether this selfexpression is welcome in your workplace.
Central to Mary Anne Case’s view of Title VII’s antistereotyping
principle is the idea that we should look to the margins as a guide for
207
determining the substance of sex equality. When she was writing in
208
the mid-1990s, the effeminate man resided at the margins of society.
201. For a discussion of prescriptive stereotypes, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes
and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 47–48 (2000). In addition to prescriptive
stereotypes, Professor Appiah also identifies two other categories of stereotypes: false
stereotypes (or prejudices) and descriptive (or statistical) stereotypes. Id.
202. See Sturm, supra note 19, at 465–68.
203. Green, supra note 19, passim.
204. See generally Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133
(2010).
205. See generally Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093
(2008).
206. Cf. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE: RETHINKING RACE IN
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 1 (2013) (“Working Identity is constituted by a range of racially
associated ways of being, including how one dresses, speaks, styles one’s hair; one’s professional
and social affiliations; who one marries or dates; one’s politics and views about race; where one
lives; and so on and so forth.”).
207. Case, supra note 176, at 105.
208. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a claim brought by a
man who charged that he was harassed because his coworkers presumed he was homosexual);
Bedker v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting a
discrimination claim brought by a man with long hair). Perhaps the best summary of the status
of effeminate men in law and society, written right around the same time as Professor Case’s
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Cultural norms have since shifted and the effeminate man, once a
209
challenge for courts, is now an easy case. But he has been replaced
at the margins by a cast of characters as diverse as they are
stigmatized. Given its remedial nature, Title VII should steer toward
the needs of these employees, the outsiders of today. This is where I
disagree with Kimberly Yuracko’s vision of sex equality. She argues
that Title VII should prohibit only discrimination “based on gender
norms or scripts that inhibit the ability of individuals of a particular
210
sex to participate successfully in the work world.” Under this view,
Title VII would provide relief for Ann Hopkins, the abrasive business
211
212
consultant, but not Peter Oiler, the man in a dress. Both violated
conventional gender norms, but only Hopkins faced a norm that
inhibits all or most women from flourishing in the workplace. “If
employers were permitted to act upon the gender script equating
aggressiveness in women with bitchiness,” Yuracko writes, “all
women would be undermined in their ability to participate fully and
213
successfully in the workplace.” Oiler, by contrast, violated a gender
norm that affected, at most, a tiny population of men. “[E]radicating
this particular gender norm is not necessary for the substantive [sex]
214
equality of women and men in the work world,” she concludes.
Aside from biological attributes like being pregnant, we should
be cautious about enshrining in law the idea that there are certain
things that women do and certain things that men do. It may very well
be that, as Yuracko points out, women who wear dresses conform to
215
social norms while men who wear dresses buck them. But the
question should not be whether a particular gender norm is harmful
to all or most women (or men); it should be whether the norm harms
an individual woman (or man). Cross-dressing is probably not
important to most men and certainly not all men. But it was very
work, is Professor Francisco Valdes’s classic article. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes,
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1995).
209. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009) (sanctioning
a sex discrimination claim brought by an effeminate man); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305
F.3d 1061, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (same); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).
210. Yuracko, supra note 19, at 225.
211. Id. at 226–27.
212. Id. at 228–29.
213. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 228.
215. Id. at 225–26.

KRAMER IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE NEW SEX DISCRIMINATION

11/26/2013 9:26 AM

931

important to Peter Oiler’s sense of his identity, just as not wearing
makeup was very important to Darlene Jespersen’s identity. Sex
discrimination law should foster an ethic of self-definition; it should
shield employees against gender norms that seek to dampen
constitutive elements of an employee’s identity. After all, the
universe of gender performances is vast, if not infinite, and one
person’s femaleness (or maleness) is no more authentic than another
216
person’s.
At this point, some may question whether sex discrimination law
is capable of personalizing antidiscrimination protections in this way.
How, for instance, will the law distinguish between norms that strike
at constitutive elements of a person’s identity and other less harmful
norms? I address these sorts of issues in greater detail in the following
Part, in which I argue that we should remake sex discrimination law
in the image of religious discrimination law. For now, however, the
short answer is that it is up to each individual employee to determine
the constitutive elements of her identity. The doctrinal structures of
religious discrimination law—the very structures I want to import into
sex discrimination law—facilitate this process of self-definition. In a
religious discrimination case, the central question is not whether a
particular trait or behavior is, from an objective standpoint, religious
in nature. Instead, the inquiry is whether the employee, in her
subjective capacity, believes the trait or behavior to be religious
217
within her own worldview. Because each employee is given room to
define the contours of her own religious beliefs and practices,
religious discrimination law makes accommodation, rather than
disparate treatment, the centerpiece of its analysis. In doing so,
religious discrimination law accomplishes something that Title VII
has otherwise been unable to do: define discrimination from the
216. A colleague jokingly referred to my argument as the “snowflake theory of sex
equality.” Like snowflakes, no two women (or men) are the same, and sex discrimination law
should foster these differences rather than squelch them.
217. In the early years of Title VII, the Supreme Court articulated a broad definition of
religion. In a case involving conscientious objectors to military service, the Court concluded that
a religious belief is “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.”
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). In a later case, the Court developed this
definition further, concluding that Title VII also protects a moral or ethical belief, so long as it
plays a role like religion in a person’s life. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1970).
In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has construed religion
broadly: “[T]he Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as
to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious
views.” 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2013).
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perspective of the victim rather than the discriminator. Because an
employee gets to determine what behaviors are central to her
identity, the central task for the law is to determine whether the
employer discriminated against the employee by not making
accommodations for the employee’s behavior.
C. Multiples
One of the hallmarks of antidiscrimination analysis is the
219
assumption that we can organize people into discrete categories. All
people have a race or a sex, for instance, so the law sets out to
categorize people along these lines. The problem, of course, is that
modern discrimination is a messy enterprise that defies neat
categorization. In its attempt to impose order on something
disorderly, employment discrimination law neglects the needs of
employees who face discrimination aimed at multiple parts of their
identity. Writing in the late 1980s, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw
sparked a discussion about the problem of intersectionality in
220
antidiscrimination law, which prompted scholars to develop a robust
221
conception of identity for purposes of proving discrimination. Using
discrimination against a black woman as her jumping off point,
Crenshaw argued that the “intersectional experience is greater than
218. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1262–63 (noting that employment discrimination
law does not, but should, address the way employees respond to discrimination).
219. This idea is, of course, textually based, as Title VII delineates certain traits as worthy of
special protection against discrimination. In this regard, antidiscrimination law’s primary thrust
is to categorize people to determine if they fit within the law’s protective umbrella.
220. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing] (“Because the
intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does
not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in
which Black women are subordinated.”); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,
1244 (1991) (“[T]he intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black women’s lives in ways
that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those
experiences separately.”).
221. See generally, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 (2001); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intersectionality in Theory and
Practice, in INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW, POWER AND THE POLITICS OF
LOCATION 124 (Emily Grabham et al. eds., 2009); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Darren Hutchinson, Identity Crisis:
“Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of
Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001); Nancy Levit, Theorizing the Connections
Among Systems of Subordination, 71 UMKC L. REV. 227 (2002); Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My
Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1991).
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the sum of racism and sexism.” A black woman’s experience cannot
be compared to the experience of either a black man or a white
woman. Neither of these latter examples captures the full range of
stereotypes and prejudices that attach uniquely to a black woman’s
experience.
Because it is stuck in what Crenshaw calls a “single-axis
223
framework,”
antidiscrimination law stumbles in the face of
224
discrimination that cuts across multiple identity traits. Ultimately,
this is a failure of group-based analysis. The dominant method of
proving discrimination today is to consider how the employer treated
225
the claimant as compared to a similarly situated employee. The
closer the similarity, the easier it is to isolate the reason for the
adverse employment action and, in turn, identify whether the
226
employer was motivated by an illegitimate purpose.
This is
discrimination by algebraic equation: cancel out the traits in common,
227
and the trait that motivated the employer’s action is left remaining.
Although helpful in theory, such analysis only works if the claimant
has someone to compare herself to.
Take Dawn Dawson as an example. Dawson worked as an
assistant and stylist-in-training at Bumble & Bumble, a high-end salon
222. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 220, at 140.
223. Id.
224. Professor Marcia McCormick offers a helpful summary of how this dynamic works:
[I]f a black woman is fired because of stereotypes of black women, she may be found
not to have suffered any discrimination at all if those stereotypes differ from
stereotypes of white women or of black men. In such a situation, a decision-maker
would be likely to find that the woman was not discriminated against because of her
race, because other members of her race (black men) did not suffer from application
of the same stereotype. That decision-maker would also likely find that she was not
discriminated against because of her sex, because other members of her sex (white
women) did not suffer from application of the same stereotype.
Marcia L. McCormick, Decoupling Employment, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 499, 519 (2012).
225. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728
(2011) (arguing against the use of comparators to assess discrimination cases).
226. The appeal of a comparator is so strong that courts have even made up hypothetical
comparators as a means to test for discrimination. In Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., 20
F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit considered a claim by a woman who alleged that
she was fired after missing a significant chunk of work due to an unusually bad case of morning
sickness. She charged that she was discriminated against because of her pregnancy, in violation
of Title VII. In its consideration of her claim, the court invented “a hypothetical Mr. Troupe,
who is as tardy as Ms. Troupe was, also because of health problems.” Id. at 738. The court went
on to note that “[i]f Lord & Taylor would have fired our hypothetical Mr. Troupe, this implies
that it fired Ms. Troupe not because she was pregnant but because she cost the company more
than she was worth to it.” Id.
227. Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc. 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Lex K. Larson, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 40.04 (2d ed. 1996)).
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in New York City. A self-described gender-nonconforming lesbian
229
woman, Dawson was fired from her assistant position and kicked
230
out of the stylist training program. The salon’s reason for these
actions was that Dawson had little chance of finding a stylist position
except in New York City because her demeanor and appearance
231
would frighten most people. On top of that, Dawson also alleged
that several of her coworkers harassed her on a regular basis,
subjecting her to a steady stream of demeaning comments, often in
232
233
front in clients. For instance, they called her “Donald.” They said
234
she should act less like a man and more like a woman. They said she
235
wore her sexuality “like a costume.” And they said she “needed to
236
have sex with a man.” Dawson responded by bringing a sex
237
discrimination claim under Title VII, which she lost handily.
As Dawson’s case demonstrates, intersectionality is a conceptual
238
blind spot for antidiscrimination law. In the eyes of the court,
239
Dawson was first and foremost a lesbian. That Dawson was also a
masculine woman, and that she faced discrimination both as a
masculine woman and as a lesbian, did not factor into the court’s
thinking. In this sense, Dawson’s case confirms Professor Crenshaw’s
central insight into the limits of existing antidiscrimination discourse:
an employee cannot inhabit more than one identity at a time. Because
it saw her as a lesbian—and as nothing but a lesbian—the court
viewed Dawson’s sex discrimination claim as an attempt to bootstrap

228. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 2005).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 214.
231. Id. at 215–16.
232. Id. at 215.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 216.
237. Id. at 213, 225.
238. A notable exception is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40
F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994), which involved a law professor who sued her university, alleging that
she was denied a position as the director of the school’s Pacific Asian Legal Studies Program
because she is an Asian-American woman. Id. at 1554. In that case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that “where two bases for discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct
components.” Id. at 1562. From there, the court determined that, when a case turns on multiple
traits, a fact finder must consider the “combination of factors” wrapped up in a person’s
identity. Id.
239. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 217–20.
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protection for sexual orientation into Title VII. Though Bumble &
241
Bumble employed outsiders of various stripes, there was no one
who could serve as a comparator for Dawson. And without a
comparator in sight, the court was able to recast Dawson’s claim,
transforming it from a hard case about gender norms into an easy
case about sexual orientation.
Taking a step back, intersectionality theory highlights an
important point about the regulatory force of employment
discrimination law. By channeling discrimination claims into a singleaxis framework, employment discrimination doctrine effectively
shapes an employee’s identity. We see this in Dawn Dawson’s case, as
the doctrine marked her as a lesbian and, in the process, erased any
sense of her female masculinity. We see it in the transgender
discrimination cases, as the doctrine forces a male-to-female
transsexual to self-identify as a man in a dress and thereby give up her
hard-fought female identity. And we see it in discrimination against a
black woman—the paradigm case of intersectionality—as the law pits
her blackness and femaleness against each other, forcing her to claim
one identity and forego the other. As a regulatory force, employment
discrimination law tends to mute difference. The time has come for a
new sex discrimination regime, one that amplifies difference rather
than dampens it. The next Part sets out to imagine just such a regime.
III. THE NEW SEX DISCRIMINATION
In this Part, I sketch a new framework for sex discrimination law
that is modeled on the protections currently available to employees in
religious discrimination cases. The defining characteristic of religious
discrimination law is its elasticity. Through various doctrinal
mechanisms, the law bends to the needs of employees, seeking to
empower employees to practice their faith without having to sacrifice
their position at work. I want to be clear at the outset, however, that I
am not proposing this shift because I think it will automatically
translate into more victories for employees in sex discrimination
cases. Rather, I propose it because religious discrimination law offers
a more sophisticated way of thinking about difference and
discrimination.

240. Id. at 218–20.
241. Id. at 214.
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The prevailing discourse in religious discrimination law is built
around twin goals of neutrality and balance. The law takes a neutral
position on what counts as religious in belief and practice, thereby
giving employees plenty of room to determine for themselves what is
242
or is not required as part of their faith. At the same time, the law
seeks to strike a balance between an employer’s needs in organizing
its workplace and an employee’s needs in furtherance of her faith. On
this latter point, employers clearly have the upper hand. In an at-will
243
environment, antidiscrimination protections can only go so far, and
the law reaches its limit once an employer offers a reasonable
accommodation or shows that no such accommodation is possible.
Yet the inquiry is what really matters. The ultimate question in a
religious discrimination case is whether an employer can adapt its
workplace to the needs of its employee and not the other way around.
Sex discrimination should follow suit. By reorganizing sex
discrimination law in this way, we can advance the needs of men and
women at the margins of our society while at the same time advancing
the work of antidiscrimination law more generally. This, in turn,
would bring us closer to the ideal of a workplace culture in which
employers make decisions on the basis of merit rather than identity.
I develop this argument in three sections. The first articulates a
doctrinal shift for sex discrimination, tracking the doctrinal
framework currently used in religious discrimination cases. The next
Section argues for a new vision of equality for sex discrimination law,
one that is steeped in difference rather than sameness. Finally, the
last Section sharpens my argument by responding to potential
critiques.
A. A New Framework
To begin, consider a garden-variety example of religious
discrimination. Abercrombie & Fitch hired Lakettra Bennett to work
242. See, e.g., Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2001). In
Anderson, the employee determined on her own that communicating “Have a Blessed Day”
when ending a conversation or written communication was an important part of her faith;
religious discrimination law does not question that determination. Id.
243. American employment follows an at-will rule, meaning that either an employer or an
employee can end an employment contract for any reason, or for no reason at all. Perhaps the
first American court to adopt the at-will rule was Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad, 81
Tenn. 507 (1884), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court held that employers “may dismiss
their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.” Id. at 519–20. Antidiscrimination
statutes like Title VII operate as a limitation on the at-will rule.
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as a sales person—or, as Abercrombie & Fitch calls it, “model”—in
244
one of its stores. Soon after that she was promoted to a manager-intraining position and transferred to one of the company’s Hollister
245
stores. At the time, Bennett followed the company’s “Look Policy,”
which required employees to wear clothes that were consistent with
the Hollister brand, namely, “ripped-up jeans, a little revealing,
246
sporty, California beach style, laid back.” Female employees in
particular were supposed to make themselves look sexy by wearing
247
tight clothing that accentuated their bodies.
The Hollister dress code soon became a problem for Bennett.
After converting to the Apostolic religion, Bennett wanted to dress
more modestly. She exchanged her short skirts for long skirts that fell
below the knee, her low cut shirts for long sleeve shirts that did not
248
show any cleavage. On her first day back to work after her
conversion, she wore an ankle-length denim skirt, which was unlike
249
anything Hollister had ever sold. Her new attire clearly violated
Hollister policy, though the company was willing to work with her.
Over the course of several meetings, the company offered a number
of alternatives to resolve the conflict between Hollister’s dress code
and Bennett’s clothing preferences. One option was to wear jeans
250
instead of skirts. Another was to wear short skirts with leggings
251
underneath to cover her legs. The final option was to look in other
stores for skirts that would be consistent with both the dress code and
252
her religious beliefs.
253
Bennett rejected all three proposals. The only accommodation
she was willing to settle for was an exception to the company’s dress
244. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie & Fitch I), No. 4:08CV1470
JCH, 2009 WL 3517578, *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie & Fitch II), No. 4:08CV1470
JCH, 2009 WL 3517584, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009) (further describing the brand’s style as
“sexy, form-fitting, and designed to show off body contours and draw attention to the wearer”);
id. (“Bennett described the length of skirts and dresses sold by Hollister during the relevant
time frame as falling just below the buttocks.”).
248. Id.
249. Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine at 2,
Abercrombie & Fitch I, 2009 WL 351578 (No. 4:08CV1470 JCH), 2009 WL 4900167.
250. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5,
Abercrombie & Fitch I, 2009 WL 351578 (No. 4:08CV1470 JCH), 2009 WL 2565188.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 5–6.
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code so that she could wear long skirts. Unwilling to make this
concession, Hollister gave Bennett two weeks to make a decision:
255
256
adhere to the policy or resign. She opted to resign. Soon afterward
she brought a religious discrimination claim under Title VII, alleging
that Hollister made no effort to reasonably accommodate her
257
religious practice.
The first step in evaluating a claim of religious discrimination is
to determine whether an employee’s beliefs constitute a “bona fide”
258
religious belief under Title VII. This is a notably relaxed standard.
There is no list of permitted religions. Nor is there any expectation
that an employee’s beliefs be in the mainstream of her faith. Instead,
the court considers whether the belief is religious within the given
259
employee’s worldview. Piercings have been held to be religious
260
261
262
263
under this standard, as have tattoos, veganism, witchcraft, and
264
even atheism. In addition, an employee must show that the religious
265
belief is sincerely held. It was the sincerity requirement that may
have posed the biggest problem for Lakettra Bennett in her suit
against Abercrombie & Fitch. Although she claimed that her faith did
not permit form-fitting clothing, she showed up to her deposition
wearing a tight shirt, which she herself described as “body
266
conscious.” The purpose of the sincerity requirement is to make
254. Id. at 7.
255. Plaintiff’s Trial Brief at 2, Abercrombie & Fitch I, 2009 WL 351578 (No. 4:08CV1470
JCH), 2009 WL 4900158.
256. Abercrombie & Fitch I, 2009 WL 351578, at *1.
257. Id.
258. See id. at *2 (“In order to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under
Title VII, Plaintiff must show that Bennett had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with
an employment requirement . . . .”).
259. See supra note 217.
260. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 129, 134–37 (1st Cir. 2004).
261. EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., No. C04-1291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at
*5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005).
262. Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL
6721098, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2012).
263. Dettmer v. London, 799 F.2d 929, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
264. Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003).
265. See EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados
de P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate both that the belief or
practice is religious and that it is sincerely held.”).
266. See Lawrence E. Dubé, Court Sends Religious Bias Case to Trial; Employee Quit Over
Retailer’s “Look Policy,” Daily Lab. Rep., No. 211, at A-5 (Nov. 4, 2009). A helpful source for
me on the Bennett case, as well as the Dubé piece just cited, was DIANE AVERY, MARIA L.
ONTIVEROS, ROBERT L. CORRADA, MICHAEL L. SELMI & MELISSA HART, EMPLOYMENT
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sure that employees do not disingenuously appeal to religion so they
267
can avoid work obligations. In one particularly memorable case, a
plaintiff was unable to convince the court that his practice of eating
268
Kozy Kitten Cat Food was a sincerely held religious belief.
Once an employee satisfies these definitional requirements—and
it is worth noting that, contrary to the cat-food eater, most employees
do in fact satisfy these requirements—the next step in the framework
269
is to look at an employer’s response to the conflict. The bulk of
religious discrimination litigation focuses on this step. Title VII
imposes on employers a duty to make reasonable accommodations
for an employee’s religious beliefs or practices. An employer is not
270
bound to accept an employee’s requested accommodation. Nor is
the obligation limitless. An employer does not have to make an
271
accommodation if doing so would pose an “undue hardship.” In an
important case, the Supreme Court defined undue hardship as a
requested accommodation that would make an employer “bear more
272
than a de minimis cost.” This standard is a boon for employers, and
it also helps reign in the reasonable accommodation theory, which has
the potential to cripple business if left unrestrained.
Lakettra Bennett’s case highlights the important role that
negotiation plays in reasonable accommodation. Rather than
rejecting her requests out of hand, the company offered Bennett
three different options to accommodate her faith. This is a hallmark
of reasonable accommodation; it facilitates an interactive process
between employer and employee, who must work together to try to
fix the problem in such a way that the employee can get back to work
and the employer’s business will not suffer too much on account of

DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 641–45
(8th ed. 2010).
267. See Reed, 330 F.3d at 935 (“[A]n employee is not permitted to redefine a purely
personal preference or aversion as a religious belief. Otherwise he could announce without
warning that white walls or venetian blinds offended his ‘spirituality,’ and the employer would
have to scramble to see whether it was feasible to accommodate him by repainting the walls or
substituting curtains for venetian blinds.” (citations omitted)).
268. See Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
269. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie & Fitch II), No.
4:08CV1470 JCH, 2009 WL 3517584, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009).
270. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1986).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
272. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
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the changes. In this regard, reasonable accommodation upends
traditional antidiscrimination discourse, and in a good way. It
transforms the employment relationship into a kind of partnership.
Not an equal partnership, to be sure, but these partnerships make it
possible for employers and employees to have an honest conversation
about difference—which differences matter, why they matter, and
274
whether there is space in the workplace for these differences. A
workplace brimming with these sorts of conversations is a breeding
ground for real social change, the kind of change that is felt beyond
275
the walls of the workplace.
1. Sex as Practice. The first step in my proposal is that sex
discrimination law track the causation standard currently in use in
religion cases. This would shift the analysis away from the
conventional “because of sex” standard that dominates sex
discrimination law today and move it more toward an individualistic
standard that focuses on the employee’s lived experience of
discrimination. For this to work, sex discrimination law will have to
embrace the idea that sex is both a status and a practice. Employees
face sex discrimination both because of who they are (status) and
because of how they act (practice). The new sex discrimination is all
about sex as a practice, capturing the performative side of a person’s
identity. The critical question will be one of self-definition: Does the
employee sincerely believe that the practice in question is constitutive
of her identity as a woman (or his identity as a man)?
Consider two examples. Start with Darlene Jespersen and
276
Harrah’s no-makeup policy.
For Jespersen, wearing makeup
conflicted with her own sense of her womanhood. She found it
273. Under the ADA—which serves as the model for Title VII’s reasonableaccommodation mandate—the “interactive process” is an important step in the reasonableaccommodation analysis. See supra note 67. The “interactive process” does not grow out of the
text of the ADA, but from an EEOC guideline on the statute. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)
(2013).
274. See KIRKLAND, supra note 75, at 136–40.
275. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKFORCE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003). Professor Estlund identifies the workplace as
uniquely situated to foster interconnectedness among a diverse citizenry, especially now that the
importance of community and civic ties are dwindling in our culture. Specifically, that work
necessitates involuntary work relationships—relationships born of necessity rather than
choice—provides people an opportunity to learn from each other and, hopefully, bridge some of
the divides that separate different groups in their private lives. Put simply, conversations and
interactions at work have the potential to change the way people live their lives.
276. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
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degrading, so much so that she could not do her job—a job she had
done exceedingly well for over twenty years—effectively. And she
sincerely felt this way. It was not the case that Jespersen immediately
developed her preference when the company announced its new
policy; she had not worn makeup at any time in her many years with
the company, nor did she wear makeup outside work. Her stance
against makeup was a deeply held conviction.
Now consider Krystal Etsitty, the transgender city bus driver
277
who was fired for using women’s restrooms along her route. The
critical question in the case would be to determine Etsitty’s sex.
Existing law defines Etsitty’s sex according to her birth sex, which was
male. This explains why Etsitty had to resort to a theory of sex
discrimination that defined her not as a woman but as a man who
faced discrimination because he wanted to wear a dress. By contrast,
my proposal allows Etsitty to define her sex consistent with her
transition, thereby allowing her to be a female. The sex practice in
question was Etsitty’s use of a women’s restroom. She would have to
argue—and I am confident she could establish—that using a women’s
restroom was constitutive of her identity as a woman. And such a
belief would, no doubt, be about as sincere as they come.
2. Accommodating Sex. The first step is the easy part. The
second step—determining whether the employer must accommodate
the sex practice—is, as it should be, a harder question. To avail
oneself of the reasonable accommodation protections, an employee
would have to engage her employer, alerting the employer to the
conflict—if the employer were not already aware of it—and opening a
line of communication to try to remedy the situation. An employer’s
duty to accommodate would not mean that an employer has to accept
any proposal put forth by one of its employees; the standard would be
one of reasonableness. If an employer offers a reasonable solution, an
employee could not reject it in favor of her own preferred solution
and still state a claim under Title VII. And if no accommodation were
possible, I would likewise adopt the undue-hardship safety valve. A
surprisingly low standard, the undue-hardship test is far more
favorable to an employer’s interests than an employee’s.
Two more points bear mentioning before considering some
examples. The first is that reasonable accommodation is a factintensive inquiry, which makes sense given that reasonable
277. See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text.
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accommodation seeks to craft individualized remedies. As such, every
case of reasonable accommodation is tailored to the needs of the
employee alleging discrimination. The second point is more of a
reminder: the real value of reasonable accommodation is that it
facilitates a conversation between employers and employees about
difference.
Now return to Darlene Jespersen’s case. Jespersen wanted an
exception to Harrah’s makeup policy. Harrah’s, by contrast, sought
uniformity; it was trying to foster an image in its casinos, and makeup
was an important part of that image. Jespersen’s history with the
company undercuts the argument that female bartenders needed to
wear makeup to do their job well. Although Harrah’s had long
278
encouraged women to wear makeup, Jespersen never did. And her
work performance did not suffer because of it. It is simply hard to
argue that her job now calls for wearing makeup. Under a reasonable
accommodation standard, Harrah’s would have to identify the costs
of honoring Jespersen’s request, as a means of arguing that
accommodating Jespersen would amount to an undue hardship. This
would be an uphill battle.
Krystal Etsitty’s case would be harder. The employer never
inquired whether certain businesses along her route would have
279
allowed Etsitty to use their bathrooms, though it is not clear that the
employer would have been required to look into this possibility. If
that were possible, however, that might have satisfied everyone’s
wishes. Another possibility is that Etsitty could have waited to use the
bathroom until after completing her route, possibly until she returned
to the bus station. If that worked, Etsitty would have had to bear the
brunt of the costs, as she would have had to wait to go the bathroom
until she finished her shift. Yet it is also possible that there are no
good solutions here. Let me stress that my proposal does not mean
that every claimant has to be accommodated. My hope is that Etsitty
and her employer would be able to work things out without having to
resort to litigation. Having an accommodation framework in place
incentivizes these sorts of negotiations, making litigation a last resort
when compromise is not possible.

278. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
279. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
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B. A New Vision of Equality
The backbone of the new sex discrimination regime is the idea
that difference is universal. In his new book Far From the Tree,
280
Andrew Solomon makes this point better than I can. Solomon is
writing in the context of parents who have children with different
identities than their own—straight parents who have a gay child, ablebodied parents who have a disabled child, and parents of average
281
intelligence who have a prodigy, to name a few examples. Yet his
claim is no less applicable to my project: “Difference unites us. While
each of these experiences can isolate those who are affected, together
they compose an aggregate of millions whose struggles connect them
profoundly. The exceptional is ubiquitous; to be entirely typical is the
282
rare and lonely state.” What Solomon has identified—and it is a
point I want to stress—is that each person’s search for identity is hers
alone. And this search does not get put on hold when an employee
enters the workplace. The idea that our work and private lives occupy
separate spheres is more metaphor than reality. Employees bring into
the workplace their preferences and biases, their relationships and
283
associations, their identities and senses of self. The workplace is an
artificial environment, assembling an increasingly diverse set of
individuals who would otherwise not interact with each other in their
284
daily lives. If anything, work magnifies the social pressures facing
outsider employees, making it all the more important for outsiders to
285
fit in among their coworkers.
For the new sex discrimination regime to take hold, we need to
recalibrate the vision of equality that undergirds sex discrimination
law. Put simply, we need to start thinking about equality in terms of
cultivating difference among employees. A helpful way to facilitate
this shift would be to expand the way we talk about Title VII’s
protections. Title VII lists prohibited bases for employment—race,
sex, religion, among others. I have made the conscious choice
throughout this Article to refer to these as “protected traits” rather

280. ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE SEARCH
FOR IDENTITY (2012).

281. See generally id.
282. Id. at 4.
283. See Zachary A. Kramer, After Work, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 628 (2007).
284. See ESTLUND, supra note 275, at 4.
285. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1269 (discussing the lengths to which outsiders
must go to fit in at work).
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than “protected groups.” In my experience, the latter formulation is
286
far more prevalent than my rendering. Though it may seem like a
minor matter of semantics, the difference between these two
formulations is actually quite meaningful, cutting to the heart of what
is at stake in employment discrimination law. When we couch Title
VII in the language of groups, we not only anchor the statute to the
needs of groups, but we also marginalize those employees who do not
fit neatly into recognized identity groups, whether because of the
complexity of their identity—think intersectionality—or because they
are the outsiders among other outsiders, the employees who have the
hardest time fitting in. My position is that sex discrimination law
needs to make a better effort to reach these employees.
I am not arguing that we should completely abandon the
sameness model. What we need is a holistic vision of equality, one
that is capable of pivoting between sameness and difference as the
case calls for it. Group-based discrimination still occurs. Take the
287
recent Wal-Mart litigation. The plaintiffs in that case charged,
among other things, that Wal-Mart discriminated against women as a
288
group in its promotion decisions. Contrast their claims with Darlene
Jespersen’s, Ann Hopkins’s, and Karen Ulane’s claims. These latter
cases are all about particular women who sought a personalized
remedy. Whereas the women of Wal-Mart wanted to be treated the
same as men, Jespersen, Hopkins, and Ulane wanted to be treated
differently than all their coworkers, men and women alike, because
they had different needs than their coworkers. Each practiced her
womanhood on her own terms—as a woman who refuses to wear
makeup, as a woman who curses and acts aggressively, and as a
woman who used to be a man. Their search for identity has carried
them beyond the bounds of what our culture currently deems
appropriate for women, and they suffered the consequences at work
because of it. Equality is a remarkably pliable concept. In its
prevailing form it works to constrain identity, discouraging
marginalized employees from embracing the full range of their
identities. Yet it also has the capacity to liberate identity, providing a
blank canvas on which employees can sketch their own concept of
286. So engrained in our thinking about discrimination, the comparator heuristic is a part of
the prima facie case for proving discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (noting that an employee must prove that she “belongs to a racial minority”
to make a prima facie case for Title VII discrimination); supra note 226.
287. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
288. Id. at 2547.
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who they are. It is possible for sex discrimination law to speak of
equality and difference in the same breath as part of a common
project. My hope is that sex discrimination law will move in that
direction.
C. Concerns
My argument is sure to have raised red flags along the way. In
this Section, I respond to three major objections, all of which I have
faced at one point or another as I have explored this project.
1. Groups Matter. The first objection is that my argument has
overlooked the value of group membership, especially in the realm of
civil-rights practice. People benefit immensely from joining and
identifying as a member of a group. Members of a group share a
common history. For many outsiders, the first step in asserting a new
identity is to walk the path of those who came before them. The
promise of group membership is a community based on shared
experience. It makes no difference where you are or where you have
been, even if you are the only person around who has your identity.
You can always identify with others like you. This is what makes Dan
289
Savage’s “It Gets Better Project” so powerful. Savage, an influential
sex-advice columnist, sought to create a vehicle to reach gay youth
290
who are victims of bullying. The immediate goal of the project was
to urge gay kids not to commit suicide in the face of harassment and
social ostracism. The broader aim, however, is to reassure these kids,
many of whom have no gay role models in their day-to-day lives, that
291
they are already part of a larger community of people just like them.
Groups matter. I would not want to suggest otherwise. My
critique of sex discrimination law is that it has lost sight of the
individual at a time when the individual is more important than ever.
This is not to say that sex discrimination can or should stop thinking
about groups. That is why I am envisioning a two-tiered sex
discrimination regime. The first tier is sex discrimination as we have
always known it, taking aim at discrimination for being male or
female. Such status discrimination cases revolve around an

289. See IT GETS BETTER PROJECT, http://www.itgetsbetter.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
290. What Is the It Gets Better Project?, IT GETS BETTER PROJECT, http://www.itgetsbetter.
org/pages/about-it-gets-better-project (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
291. See id. (describing the purpose of the website as providing a forum for communication
with the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community).
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employee’s group membership. The second tier is focused on
individualized harms. These are the cases in which the employee faces
discrimination not because of who she (or he) is, but because of how
she (or he) acts in the workplace. Whereas the first tier is concerned
with being, the second tier is concerned with doing. The reforms I
have presented would apply only to the second tier of cases. The
purpose of the new sex discrimination is to supplement the old sex
discrimination, not to replace it. Together, they will work in concert
to strike at the full spectrum of sex discrimination as it exists today.
2. Flood and Stretch. The next major concern is that my proposal
broadens the concept of sex discrimination far beyond anything we
have seen before in American law. Consider a hypothetical to
292
sharpen the critique. Say that an employee wants to be excused
from work two days a week so he can practice karate. When the
employer resists—as the employer most certainly would—the
employee demands an accommodation because his karate practice is
an essential part of his manhood. How is it that we can still call this
sex discrimination? There are traits that, even if you do not think
should be protected, are clearly linked to sex in some way—refusing
to wear makeup, cross-dressing, and transitioning from one sex to
another are prime examples. But practicing karate is something else
entirely. If the employee gets to define what practices are constitutive
of identity, then the employee has a lot of room—arguably too much
room—to determine the substance of sex discrimination law.
There are two ways of thinking about this objection—flood and
stretch. Let me start with flood. The argument is that my proposal will
lead to a deluge of sex discrimination cases, which will drain resources
that would be better spent on other, more serious forms of
293
discrimination. For instance, one may argue that neither being
forced to wear makeup nor being denied time to practice karate can
compare to a case in which an employer discriminates on the basis of
race. Though I am sympathetic to this concern, I am uncomfortable
with any conception of workplace equality that subscribes to a strict
hierarchy of harms. Title VII is not like the Equal Protection Clause;
there are no levels of scrutiny, no differing standards depending on

292. Thanks to David DePianto for the following hypothetical.
293. See generally William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An Empirical
Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (2001) (outlining this concern in the context of sexualorientation discrimination law).
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the trait at issue. Although others might see makeup as a relatively
minor matter, it was not to Jespersen, and that is what matters most
to the vision of sex equality I have put forth in this Article. Moreover,
the flood concern assumes that a more lenient standard automatically
leads to more litigation. The time, money, and inconvenience of
litigating, not to mention how it disrupts their employment
relationship, will dissuade most people from wasting the effort of
bringing a sex discrimination case. Only those who feel strongly about
the employer’s decision will resort to litigation. So if the employee
truly believes that his manhood is tied up in his karate practice, then
sex discrimination law should care about it, even if it ultimately
cannot provide the man with a remedy.
As for stretch, the argument is that if anything and everything
counts as sex, then there is no limit on sex discrimination. I want to
respond in two ways. The first is to emphasize that there is a limiting
principle built into my proposal. Just like in a religious discrimination
case, an employment decision would be sex based provided two
conditions are met. First, the identity trait in question must be sex
based within the employee’s worldview. This may seem far too openended, but it will work for the same reason it already works in
religious discrimination cases: individuals are in the best position to
define the terms of their own identity. Second, the employee’s belief
that the trait under attack is sex based must be sincerely held. As is
the case with religious discrimination, the purpose of the sincerity
requirement is to safeguard against employees using sex
discrimination as an excuse to avoid work obligations.
The second point in response to the stretch argument is that we
should not think of antidiscrimination law only as a means to right
wrongs. In addition to remedying specific cases of discrimination,
antidiscrimination law also facilitates a critical conversation about
identity and difference—a conversation that takes place in
workplaces, in courts, in the media, and in people’s daily lives.
Although he ultimately leans away from the law as a tool for civil
294
rights, Kenji Yoshino celebrates the virtues of a “reason-forcing
conversation,” a conversation in which those who seek to impose a
295
burden on an outsider must justify their reason for doing so. As

294. YOSHINO, supra note 31, at 194–95.
295. Id. at 178 (emphasis omitted).
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Yoshino writes, these conversations “reveal the true dimension of
296
civil rights.”
Stretch is not a bad thing. Outside of biological differences, sex
does not have natural boundaries. The problem with existing sex
discrimination doctrine is that it tries to draw firm lines around sex.
By contrast, my proposal takes a hands-off approach, leaving it up to
the individual to set the boundaries for what constitutes sex. None of
us is in a good position to tell the man that practicing karate is not
essential to his manhood; it is something only he can decide for
himself. What the law can do, however, is facilitate a conversation
between the man and his employer, in the hope that they can come to
some resolution of the situation. In this case, the requested
accommodation seems unlikely. I do not expect that any court would
second-guess the employer’s decision not to let the man take off work
to practice karate. But that is beside the point I want to make here.
The conversation is what matters. At every turn, my proposal points
toward conversation as an important means of bringing about social
change. It gives the employee an outlet to express his identity. It lets
employers explain what they need from their employees to maintain
good order in the workplace. And, most important of all, it harnesses
the power to change people’s minds about difference.
3. Religion Is Special. Religion holds a special status in our legal
culture. Under the First Amendment, the state can neither prefer nor
297
inhibit religious practice. Religion receives this special status
because of the critical role that religious freedom played in the
founding of our country. Yet this special status also stems from the
fact that we tend to think of religion as being somehow different than
the other traits protected by antidiscrimination law. This helps to
explain the so-called “ministerial exception” to Title VII, a judicially
created rule that allows religious institutions to engage in overt
discrimination for positions related to the institution’s religious
298
mission. And it also helps to explain why claimants in religious
discrimination cases have access to a separate antidiscrimination
regime than claimants alleging other forms of discrimination. Thus it

296. Id. at 195.
297. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
298. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706
(2012) (upholding an exception to antidiscrimination laws that applies when religious
institutions hire employees).
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is only fair to question whether sex discrimination likewise deserves
accommodation.
This is an important objection, raising a roadblock to my
proposal that is both legal and ideological in nature. Let me start with
a concession: I cannot overcome the point that religion deserves
special treatment for historical reasons. Employment discrimination
law is structured so as to give employees a reasonable amount of
space to practice their faith, space that it is not available to employees
to explore other aspects of their identity. Set aside the historical and
textual reasons for treating religious discrimination differently. Are
there other reasons to explain why religion is different than sex (or
any other protected trait under Title VII)?
The obvious point to consider is that religion is mutable and the
other traits are immutable. The theory here is that religion requires
special treatment because it is not a fixed identity like a race or sex. It
comes down to a person’s control over her identity. If a person can
change her religion—or even abandon religion altogether—then the
person has a greater say in who she is and how she lives her life. We
do not, by contrast, get to choose our race, race being biologically
determined. Sex is another story, though. Although the vast majority
of people do not exercise choice over their sex, some people do, going
to great lengths to change their birth sex. Indeed, the great lesson of
the transgender cases is that, where there is a will, there is a way to
change one’s sex. At least as far as immutability is concerned, religion
and sex are more alike than different.
Maybe we need a softer definition of immutability. Rather than
thinking of traits as locked identities, we can define immutability as a
trait that is so central to our sense of self that it would be extremely
difficult to change. We see this view of immutability used in asylum
law, in which courts have ruled, for instance, that sexuality and
gender identity “are immutable; they are so fundamental to one’s
299
identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.”
Under this view, immutability is more about the effect of changing
one’s identity rather than the ability to change it. Yet this new
definition would not resolve the problem at hand. Once again, the
transgender example suggests that changeability is not a useful
dividing line. Converting one’s sex is no less fraught than converting
one’s religion; that a person wants to change his or her sex, and is
299. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005).
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willing to spend the time, money, and emotional energy to do so, says
a lot about how important the change is to the person’s sense of self.
We could say the same about converting from gay to straight, forcing
oneself not to cross-dress, or wearing makeup even though it makes
one’s skin crawl. Forcing or expecting people to change traits that are
constitutive of their identity is like asking them to be somebody
300
else. In this regard, religion is not all that different than any other
important identity trait that is capable of change.
IV. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Before concluding, I want to take a step back to consider some of
the broader implications of my argument. My goal in this Part is to lay
the groundwork for future discussions. To that end, I raise two
questions about the future of employment discrimination law in light
of my proposals for sex discrimination law. Because these questions
provoke ideas that are each capable of sustaining an article unto
itself, I simply cannot answer them in this space. Yet they are worth
considering, if fleetingly, in the hope that they will stimulate future
conversation about how antidiscrimination law should adapt to the
changing nature of employment discrimination.
A. Beyond Sex
Sex discrimination is only a small sliver of employment
discrimination law. What about the other traits protected by Title
301
VII? Surely one could make a parallel argument about, say, race.
Like sex, race is both a status and a practice, a marker of both who an
employee is and how the employee presents herself in the workplace.
And like sex discrimination, modern race discrimination is primarily
about the performative aspects of a person’s racial identity. Consider
302
a prominent case. American Airlines refused to allow Renee
303
Rogers, an African-American woman, to wear her hair in cornrows.
Rogers argued that the all-braided hairstyle held a special significance
300. This is reminiscent of Tobias Wolff’s critique of the military’s now-defunct “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy, which required lesbian and gay service members to present themselves as
heterosexual. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and
the U.S. Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141 (1997).
301. National origin is another good example, particularly with respect to English-only
policies in workplace. For useful discussion of the language discrimination cases, see generally
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1689 (2006).
302. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
303. Id. at 231.
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304

for her as a black woman in America. It was, in other words, critical
to her sense of her own racial identity.
Rogers ultimately lost her case, with the court drawing a
distinction between a natural hairstyle (such as an Afro) and one
305
based on artifice. Braids were of the latter variety, according to the
306
court, and therefore beyond the reach of Title VII. Scholars have
307
written strong critiques of the court’s decision. My interest in the
case lies elsewhere. Later on in its opinion, the court notes that
American Airlines would have allowed Rogers to put her hair in a
308
bun and wrap a hairpiece around the bun. After trying it out,
though, Rogers rejected this option because the hairpiece gave her
309
severe headaches. The court does not frame the inquiry this way,
but this is textbook accommodation analysis. The employer had a rule
that prevented Rogers from wearing her hair in a manner that was
critical to her sense of self as a black woman. The employer proposed
a solution to the conflict—wearing her braids in a bun and hairpiece.
It is hard to say whether the proposed accommodation was
reasonable, but that is something that could be addressed through
litigation.
Renee Rogers’s case further demonstrates that accommodation
is a natural way of thinking about identity and difference in the
workplace. Moreover, it also suggests that existing conceptions of
racial identity—like existing conceptions of sex and gender—do not
capture the full range of how employees perform their identity in the
workplace. Thus, as we look to the future of employment
discrimination law, we need to consider whether other kinds of
discrimination—race, national origin, and age, among others—should
likewise move toward the antidiscrimination model I have proposed
for sex discrimination.

304. Id. at 231–32.
305. Id. at 232.
306. Id.
307. See, e.g., D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair . . . in the
Workplace, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405, 412–14 (2011); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another
Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1090–93
(2010). See generally Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365.
308. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
309. Id.
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B. Beyond Title VII
There is a growing sense among scholars that Title VII may not
be up to the task of eradicating employment discrimination as it exists
today. Suzanne Goldberg writes that employment discrimination law
310
Elizabeth Glazer argues that
“is in the midst of a crisis.”
311
employment discrimination law “needs help.” Marcia McCormick
notes that employment discrimination law has effectively stalled,
312
accomplishing little since the 1980s. And Nancy Levit has shown
that employment discrimination law is on the wrong side of changing
313
workforce demographics. I am likewise concerned that Title VII is
ill-equipped to face the challenges raised by modern discrimination.
The reforms I have proposed in this Article only go so far. Though
they may improve the law’s approach to sex discrimination, they do
not alter the architecture of employment discrimination law as a
whole.
Perhaps the time has come to adopt a new regulatory scheme for
employment discrimination. The idea has intuitive appeal. After all,
modern discrimination bears little resemblance to what
discrimination looked like when Title VII became law. In her work on
trait discrimination, Kimberly Yuracko offers Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s inability to find legal work as an attorney as a good
314
example of what discrimination used to look like.
Despite
graduating third in her class at Stanford Law School, the only law
315
firm job Justice O’Connor could get was as a legal secretary.
Discrimination used to be about formal segregation and exclusion.
Today, however, it is about not fitting in at work. The Justice
O’Connors of the world have been replaced by the likes of Darlene
Jespersen, Peter Oiler, and Dawn Dawson, men and women whose
identities mark them as different from their coworkers. If
discrimination has changed so much, why has discrimination law
changed so little?

310. Goldberg, supra note 225, at 731.
311. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Repairing Antidiscrimination Law from the Inside Out 1
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
312. See McCormick, supra note 224, at 500.
313. See generally Nancy Levit, Changing Workforce Demographics and the Future of the
Protected Class Approach, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 463 (2012).
314. Yuracko, supra note 19, at 167–68.
315. Id.
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Whether we should adopt a new regime and what that regime
might look like are important questions that warrant deeper
consideration than I can offer in this space. Though I may not have
broken Title VII’s mold, I have offered a new way of thinking about
sex discrimination—and possibly other forms of discrimination, too.
My hope is that, at the very least, this Article will stimulate further
discussion about whether and how we can make employment
discrimination law more attuned to the needs of employees as it finds
them today.
CONCLUSION
In an influential sexual harassment case, Justice Scalia once
wrote that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil
to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
316
legislators by which we are governed.” Though he was writing about
317
a particular issue in sex discrimination law, I take Justice Scalia’s
words to be a broader statement about the scope and ambitions of
employment discrimination law in general. He recognized both that
discrimination will change over time and that, for it to be effective,
the law must change, too. In that spirit, this Article has proposed
significant structural changes to sex discrimination law. My hope is
that these changes will make the law more effective in its ongoing and
ever-changing fight against sex discrimination.

316. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
317. See id. at 79–80 (holding that employees can raise same-sex sexual harassment claims
under Title VII).

